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INTRODUCTION
For several decades, state legislatures and courts have struggled
with the question of how to rationalize the system of tort liability as it
relates to medical malpractice. It has become commonplace to speak
of the costs of malpractice litigation as having reached "crisis" levels,
ith profound impacts on physicians' professional lives, the quality
and quantity of health care delivered in this country, and the nation's
fisc. Indeed, both the direct and the indirect costs of malpractice
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litigation take a heavy toll on litigants and their insurers. Direct costs
accrue in the form of litigation expenses and damages paid by
malpractice liability insurers to successful plaintiffs.' Indirect costs
arise in the form of "defensive medicine," that is, "physicians'
ordering of tests and procedures... primarily [for the purpose of
reducing] their exposure to malpractice risk."' Researchers have
encountered difficulties in ascertaining the precise magnitude of
these costs,3 but there is general agreement that they are significant.
According to one estimate, the cost of defensive medicine is nearly $7
billion, and the total cost of the medical malpractice system
(including damage awards, malpractice insurance premiums, and
4
defensive medicine) is over $22 billion per year.
Not all of this cost is socially inefficient. To be sure, it is desirable
to have in place a medical malpractice system that channels
reasonable compensation to the victims of medical negligence, even if
it involves some transaction costs in the form of litigation expenses.
However, there is little doubt that a portion of these costs are
"excessive" in the sense that they are unrelated to this goal. Defensive
medicine costs are "excessive" if they are incurred to pay for health
services that contribute nothing to the health and well-being of the
patients for which they are ordered. Litigation expenses may be
"excessive" in two ways: First, the costs associated with achieving the
"correct" outcome in a malpractice case may be higher than
necessary (for example, because too much discovery was conducted or
I See Michael Daly, Attacking Defensive Medicine Through the Utilization of Practice
Parameters: Panacea or Placebo for the Health Care Reform Movement?, 16 J. LEGAL MED.
101, 104 (1995) (reporting that 60¢ to 70¢ of every dollar paid to plaintiffs in
malpractice damage awards goes to pay for litigation expenses).
2 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 98TH CONG., IMPACT OF LEGAL REFORMS
ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COSTS 6 (1993) (citation omitted).
It is difficult to separate out medical services that are ordered by physicians
primarily or solely out of fear of liability from those ordered out of medical necessity.
See Daly, supra note 1, at 105 (noting an "inability to separate liability-induced clinical
practices from fee-for-service-induced practices").
4 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 103D CONG., DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 155 (1994) [hereinafter OTA REPORT]. The figures cited are
adjusted from the figures in 1984 dollars given in the Office of Technology Assessment
Report. See also Deborah W. Gamick et al., Can Practice Guidelines Reduce the Number and
Costs of Malpractice Claims?, 266 JAMA 2856, 2856 (1991) (summarizing the various
economic and social costs of the current malpractice system). But cf. OTA REPORT,
supra, at 47-48, 74, 154-56 (noting the methodological difficulties of measuring the cost
of defensive medicine).
By "correct" outcome in a malpractice case, I mean one that accurately reflects
the true presence or absence of negligence on the part of the defendant.
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an excessive number of high-priced medical experts was employed).
Second, all costs incurred in cases in which an "incorrect" result is
reached are socially inefficient. That is, an award of damages to a
plaintiff who was not, in fact, the victim of medical negligence is an
"excessive" cost of the medical malpractice system. The expense of
litigation that does not result in compensation for an authentic
malpractice victim is also inefficient. Efforts to reduce costs in the
medical malpractice system should thus be aimed at three targets:
discouraging defensive medicine, lowering the costs of producing
accurate outcomes, and decreasing the incidence of incorrect
outcomes.
In the last ten years, there has been increasing attention paid to
the possibility of using clinical practice guidelines ("CPGs") to
accomplish these goals. CPGs are consensus statements developed by
various bodies-public and private-about what constitutes
appropriate treatment for a specific condition, set of symptoms, or
preventive care goal. The Institute of Medicine has defined CPGs as
"systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and patient
decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical
circumstances."c' Because they derive from the consensus of experts,
CPGs are thought to represent the prevailing standard of care in the
medical profession. It is not surprising, then, that would-be tort
reformers have suggested using CPGs as evidence of the legal
7standard of care in medical malpractice cases.
At first blush, this proposal is attractive. The reformers point out
that at present, the medical malpractice system is pervaded by
uncertainty: uncertainty as to what constitutes the legal standard of
care, uncertainty as to what evidence will be sufficient to prove a
breach of that standard, and uncertainty as to the magnitude of the
damages a jury will award if it is convinced by that evidence. This
uncertainty is manifested in physicians' pursuit of defensive
" COMMITTEE ON CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES, INSTITUTE OF MNIEDICINE,
GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE 2 (Marilynj. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1992)
(internal quotation marks omitted). For a description of the process of guideline
development, see Steven H. Woolf, Practice Guidelines, a New Reality in Medicine: II.
Mtchods of Developing Guidelines, 152 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 946 (1992).
7 See. e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing
Physican Liability, L"w & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1991, at 91; Richard E. Leahy,
Comment, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of Care: A Call for Judicial
Dfr.nce to Medical Practice Guidelines, 77 CAL. L. RE,. 1483 (1989); see also ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2971-2979 (West 2000).
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medicine. 8 Unsure about exactly what is required of them, and averse
to the risk of being sued, physicians protect themselves by ordering
tests and other services that may be medically unnecessary but that will
create a "paper trail" that they can later invoke in defense of the care
rendered. If physicians knew ex ante that the standard of care to
which they had a legal duty to conform was inscribed in black and
white in a compendium of CPGs, it is argued, two benefits would be
reaped. Physicians would operate under less uncertainty, and
consequently would practice medicine less defensively. Additionally,
physicians would have an incentive to comply with CPGs, which
represent our best estimate of what constitutes good quality care.
This Article attempts to evaluate these arguments in light of the
existing empirical evidence concerning the use of CPGs in medical
practice and as the legal standard of care. It is proposed that while
there may be certain efficiencies associated with the use of CPGs as
the legal standard of care, their use is deeply problematic. The
argument proceeds as follows: Courts, state legislatures, and academic
commentators have suggested a variety of ways in which CPGs could
be incorporated into malpractice litigation.9 While empirical evidence
indicates that CPGs currently are being used both as exculpatory
evidence (by physician defendants) and as inculpatory evidence (by
plaintiffs), statutory reforms enacted to date provide for the one-way,
"shield-only" use of CPGs.0 Indeed, there are good reasons to
disallow their inculpatory use. Chief among these is that CPGs do not,
in fact, appear to represent prevailing medical practice in most
instances. But permitting physicians to use CPGs as an affirmative
defense in malpractice litigation while denying plaintiffs the right to
use this evidence to prove their own case would also be problematic.
Restricting one party's access to relevant, probative, and otherwise
admissible evidence on a key element of a legal claim is an anomaly in
the law" and requires strong justification. There is no such
justification for restricting the use of CPGs. Thus, CPGs should either
be available to all parties or to none. Because of the problems
associated with the inculpatory use of CPGs, the best course of action
8 Daniel W. Shuman, The Psycholog of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REv.
115, 124 (1993).
9 Infra Part I.D.
1o See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.02 (West. Supp. 1998); KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 342.035(8) (Michie 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2971-2979 (West 2000).
1 See FED. R. EvID. 402 (setting out the bedrock rule of evidence that presumes all
relevant evidence, unless othervise excluded, will be admitted).
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is to restrict their use by both plaintiffs and defendants.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background
information about the evolution and purpose of CPGs, the standard
of care in medical malpractice cases, current uses of CPGs in
malpractice litigation, and reform proposals. Part II presents
arguments against the use of CPGs to prove that the defendant
physician breached the standard of care. Part III discusses the
problems with allowing the one-way exculpatory use of CPGs by
defendants. Part IV presents some concluding thoughts on the role
CPGs should play in malpractice litigation in the future.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Evolution and Purpose of Clinical Practice Guidelines
CPGs have been a part of medical practice for more than half a
century. Interest in the possibilities of using CPGs to improve
medical practice grew in the 1970s and 1980s after health services
researchers discovered wide variations in care processes between
different geographic locations within the United States.'3  Practice
variation is thought to imply an overuse of medical procedures in
some geographic areas, and/or an underuse in other areas, that is
attributable to physicians' uncertainty regarding appropriate
indications for particular treatments.14 In response to these empirical
findings, health economists such as Alain Enthoven began advocating
the use of cost-effectiveness analysis to root out socially inefficient
medical practices." Cost-effectiveness analysis and a related method
j - IL Dale Walker et al., Medical Practice Guidelines, 161 W.J. MED. 39, 39 (1994)
(citing Steven H. Woolf, Practice Guidelines: A New Reality in Medicine: L Recent
D,, lopments, 150 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1811 (1990)).
a- Ste, flg.,James M. Perrin et al., Variations in Rates of Hospitalization of Children in
"h,, Urban Communities, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1183 (1989) (stud)ing Boston,
Rochester, and New Haven); John Wennberg & Alan Gittelsohn, Small Area Variations
in Halth Care Delivey, 182 SCIENCE 1102 (1973) (studing Vermont); John E.
Wennberg et al., Art Hospital Services Rationed in New Haven or Over-Utilized in Boston?,
329 L NCET 1185 (1987) (studying New Haven and Boston).
Walker, supra note 12, at 40.
. ,,J. Rosser Matthews, Practice Guidelines and Tort Reform: The Legal System
Confronts th Technocratic 1ish, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 275, 279-82 (1999)
(discussing Enthoxen's work regarding carotid endarterectomies); Lori Rinella,
Comment, The Ue. of Medical Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation-Should
Pmtic.. Gumddines Dtfine the Standard of Care?, 64 UMKC L. REv. 337, 341 (1995) (noting
that practice guidelines may reduce waste and abuse).
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of evaluating clinical interventions, outcomes research, 6 have
produced a large body of findings concerning the efficacy of various
health services, upon which clinical practice guidelines can be based.
A number of different parties have involved themselves in
composing and disseminating CPGs. The promulgators can be
grouped into three categories: professional societies, government
bodies, and health care payers (that is, HMOs and insurance
companies). The American Medical Association ("AMA") and more
than fifty physician specialty boards have been involved in the
development of CPGs."7 CPGs developed by professional medical
societies are regarded as highly authoritative,"8 due to both physicians'
expertise and the fact that, unlike insurers, physicians' financial
incentives traditionally have been aligned with providing top-quality
care to their patients. Guidelines developed by professional societies
tend to be broad and flexible in nature, leaving substantial room for
physicians to exercise clinical judgment. The AMA refers to its CPGs
as "parameters" to connote that the guidelines are meant merely to
identify "floors" and "ceilings" of appropriate care, defining a range of
acceptable practices from which physicians can select according to
their training and judgment. 9
Medical professional societies have two motivations for developing
CPGs. First, they seek to reduce the incidence of avoidable medical
injuries and improve the quality of care by reducing overuse of certain
services. The AMA has stated:
In essence, it is hoped that practice parameters will enable physicians to
provide high-quality medical care more effectively and efficiently,
thereby responding to society's need to control health care expenditures
without sacrificing the quality of care. It is expected that practice
parameters will help physicians reduce the amount of unnecessary or
inappropriate care for patients [and] reduce the incidence of avoidable
injuries caused by substandard care and the amount of defensive
16 Outcomes research is similar to cost-effectiveness analysis in that it examines the
relative efficacy of different treatments in achieving desired clinical outcomes, but
outcomes research does not focus on the comparative evaluation of the costs of
different interventions. Megan L. Sheetz, Note, Toward Controlled Clinical Care Through
Clinical Practice Guidelines: The Legal Liabiliy for Developers and Issuers of Clinical Pathways,
63 BRooK. L. REv. 1341, 1349-50 (1997).
17 SeeWalker, supra note 12, at 40.
is See Leahy, supra note 7, at 1510-13 (noting that CPGs developed by professional
medical societies are highly regarded within the medical profession).
19 Havighurst, supra note 7, at 91.
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medicine ....
In addition, medical professionals have developed their own
guidelines as a means of defending themselves against competing
guidelines promulgated by health care payers. The payers' guidelines,
which are influenced by insurers' cost-consciousness, are frequently
more restrictive and perceived to pose a threat to physicians'
autonomy."'
The federal and state governments have recently joined the
professional societies' efforts to develop CPGs. In 1989, Congress
created the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research ("AHCPR"),
now renamed the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
("AHRQ"), to "enhance the quality, appropriateness, and effectiveness
of health care services" through, among other things, "the
development and periodic review and updating of... clinically
relevant guidelines." 2  In the past decade, AHCPR/AHRQ has
become a major force in the creation and dissemination of guidelines
in a wide range of areas. Although not as active as the federal
government, several states also have ongoing projects to develop CPGs
as part of statewide medical quality improvement programs and
initiatives to reduce malpractice costs.
"
Managed care organizations and traditional health insurers have
developed their own guidelines for appropriate care. While
guidelines created by professional and government bodies usually
serve merely to educate physicians in the hope that they will choose to
change their practice behavior, guidelines created by health care
payers are often used for utilization review and physician profiling
purposes. Utilization review is the evaluation by a third-party payer of
a physician's treatment orders in order to make decisions about
whether medical care will be paid for by the insurer. Physician
profiling is a payer's analysis of a physician's practice patterns for
purposes of judging whether the physician is practicing cost-efficient
Edwvard B. Hirshfeld, From the Office of the General Counsel: Should Practice
Parametes Be the Standard of Care in Malpractice Litigation?, 266JAMA 2886, 2887 (1991)
(citations omitted).
rSee Stephen M. Merz, Clinical Practice Guidelines: Policy Issues and Legal
Ihliations, 19 JOINT COMMISSION J. ON QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 306, 308 (1993)
(noting that peer re~iew organizations may refuse payment based on these guidelines);
Rinella, supra note 15, at 341 ("Physicians want their own guidelines to determine
rexiew and payment criteria to defend against unmerited payment denial by third party
payers.").
Merz, supra note 21, at 307 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
- S,e d. at 307 (noting the efforts made by ten states as of 1989).
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24
care. Compliance with CPGs clearly assumes added importance
when the physician knows that his patient may not receive coverage
for the services he requests on the patient's behalf if those services are
not indicated by the relevant practice guideline. Compliance with
CPGs may even be an explicit or implicit requirement of a physician's
participation in an HMO.'
While guidelines developed by professional medical societies are
focused primarily on achieving the best medical outcomes, guidelines
developed by health care payers are heavily influenced by cost-control
concerns.26 Thus, payer-developed guidelines should be viewed as less
authoritative than those developed by economically disinterested
researchers and clinicians.
Recent years have seen the issuance of CPGs by malpractice
liability insurers as well as health insurers. "Liability insurance carriers
are also financially motivated, but their goal is to profit by controlling
malpractice losses through the promulgation and enforcement of
specific clinical standards."27  Because malpractice suits are best
avoided by ensuring good clinical outcomes, malpractice insurers
have more incentive than health insurers to adopt CPGs that
emphasize top-quality care over low-cost care. These guidelines thus
fall somewhere between payer guidelines and professional societies'
guidelines on the continuum of authoritativeness. 2s' Like health
insurers, many liability insurers have taken specific steps to enforce
compliance with their guidelines. For example, the Utah Medical
24 See William Trail & Brad A. Allen, Government Created Medical Practice Guidelines,
10J.L. & HEALTH 231, 236 (1995-96) (explaining physician profiling).
2 See Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Health Care Reform, 5
HEALTH MATRIX 369, 374 (1995).
26 SeeJohn D. Ayres, The Use and Abuse of Medical Practice Guidelines, 15J. LEG. MED.
421, 437 (1994) ("[Slome payers use parameters, indeed develop them, as a method to
maximize profits under the guise of reducing inefficient or unnecessary services.");
Daniel W. Shuman, The Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Claims, Clinical Practie
Guidelines, and Managed Care: Towards a Therapeutic Harmony?, 34 CAL. W. L. REv. 99,
103 (1997) ("Although clinical practice guidelines were initially driven by concerns
with the quality of care, currently their use by managed care plans is often driven by
concerns with the cost of care."). For a summary of empirical findings concerning the
effect of CPGs on medical costs, see Steven H. Woolf, Practice Guidelines: A New Reality
in Medicine: III. Impact on Patient Care, 153 ARcHivEs INTERNAL MED. 2646, 2649
(1993).
27 Marshall B. Kapp, 'Cookbook' Medicine: A Legal Perspective, 150 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 496, 497 (1990).
28 But see Woolf, supra note 26, at 2652 (noting that because liability insurers'
guidelines are designed to minimize malpractice claims, "the recommendations ma)
reflect legal more than scientific evidence").
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Insurance Association and a Colorado insurer require compliance
with their obstetrical guidelines as a condition of malpractice
coverage.' Other insurers raise or lower physicians' malpractice
insurance premium rates depending upon their willingness to comply
with the CPGs.
The combined efforts of professional organizations, federal and
state governments, and health care and liability insurers have
produced a staggering number of CPGs. A 1994 review estimated that
more than 1600 different CPGs had been created over the years.3 " As
noted above, these guidelines vary widely in quality.3' They also vary
in scope. Some CPGs are narrowly drawn descriptions of clinical
procedures that leave little room for discretion on the part of the
physician, while others are vague recommendations as to how
complex medical problems might be approached.3 Some clinical
problems are quite amenable to governance by a rigid algorithm. For
example, the administration of anesthesia "can be handled in
essentially the same way for a wide spectrum of patients." In
contrast, a problem like clinical depression requires a large amount of
clinical judgment, and the guidelines for that condition are
34correspondingly general.
The overall picture of CPGs is thus characterized by tremendous
diversity-in the parties creating the guidelines, their motivations, the
intended purposes of the guidelines, the type of evidence upon which
the guidelines are based, the procedures through which the
guidelines are developed, the scope of the guidelines, the specificity
of the recommendations, and physicians' perceived need to comply
-' INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND THE DEUVERY
OF OBSTETRICAL CARE 118 (1989).
&.Ayres, supra note 26, at 421.
So' Mark Kadzielski et al., Peer Review and Practice Guidelines Under Health Care
PLfrin, 16 WHITHIER L. REv. 157, 161 (1995) ("[T]here exists [sic] good guidelines
which are xalid and have potential use, as well as bad guidelines which may be equated
uith 'junk science."').
_', Compare Activities During the Examination, QUALITY DETERMINANTS OF
\I\IMOGRAPHl: CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINE NO. 13 (Agency for Healthcare
Rcearch and Quality, Rockxille, Md.), Oct. 1994 (giing detailed instructions for the
performance of mammograms), with Effects of Cardiac Rehabilitation Exercise Training,
C \RDLkC REHABILITATION: CLINICAkL PRACTICE GUIDELINE No. 17 (Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, Md.), Oct. 1995 (offering only general
advice for cardiac rehabilitation).
. Sheetz, supra note 16, at 1346-47 (quoting Hirshfeld, supra note 20, at 2886); see
al) Ayres, supra note 26, at 427 (observing that anesthesiology guidelines "concern
highly specific aspects of patient care in a controlled environment").
-h1fra note 179 and accompanying text.
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ith the guidelines. Tort reformers who propose to use CPGs as the
standard of care in medical malpractice cases therefore have many
questions to answer regarding which guidelines will be applied in a
particular case and why. "Practice parameters that address the same
clinical problem, but have different applications, goals, and
recommendations will present a problem for courts."3' Guidelines
that were developed with a particular goal in mind-for example, cost
control, or providing the highest quality of care that is technologically
possible-may not be easily transferable to the litigation setting.
While many of the promulgators of guidelines have discussed the
possibility that their guidelines might be used by litigants in
malpractice cases, this does not appear to have been their intention.
One review article in a medical journal comments:
The good news is that the guidelines are not standards of care, meaning
mandatory requirements for practitioners. Rather, they are rudimentary
road maps outlining options in the diagnosis and treatment of particular
conditions.
... [L]itigators can inappropriately use the guidelines as a defined
recipe (i.e., a standard of care) that, if not followed, provides a basis for
a lawsuit.36
For these reasons, the fact that CPGs may usefully guide the
practice of medicine does not necessarily imply that they also should
guide the practice of medical malpractice law. In order to understand
how CPGs might or might not be appropriate decision tools in
malpractice cases, it is necessary to understand their relation to the
legal standard of care in medical malpractice suits as established at
common law. The following sub-Part provides a brief review of this
standard.
B. The Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Cases
Medical malpractice claims are adjudicated under a negligence
standard. The plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) that the
defendant physician owed a duty of care; (2) that the defendant
breached this duty; (3) that the breach was the proximate cause of the
plaintiffs injuries; and (4) that the plaintiff actually incurred damages
35 Hirshfeld, supra note 20, at 2888.
36 A. John Rush, Clinical Practice Guidelines: Good News, Bad News, or No News?, 50
ARcIuVEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY483, 486 (1993).
OF SWORDS AND SHIELDS
as a result of the physician's conduct.f' The physician's duty is defined
by the legal standard of care. While the standard of care in medical
negligence cases has changed somewhat over time, the basic
standard-as in nonmedical negligence cases-is "reasonable and
ordinary care." More specifically, a physician must exercise that
degree of care which would be exercised by a physician in good
standing in the same medical specialty in a similar community in like
circumstances. '
Until the middle of the twentieth century, state courts adhered to
a "locality rule," which held physicians to the standard of care
determined by other physicians in the same locality." The
justification for this rule was that "disparities in medical knowledge
and equipment between rural and urban communities resulting from
differences in communication, transportation, and economic
resources" made it unfair to hold rural practitioners to the same
standard as urban physicians.4" It was difficult for plaintiffs to prevail
under the locality rule because courts required the expert witnesses
called to testify as to the standard of care to be from the same locality
as the defendant physician. Physicians working in the same town
typically refused to give testimony that would incriminate a colleague,
so plaintiffs were left without available experts to support their claims.
Additionally, the focus on localities produced wide variations in the
legal standards of care (and case outcomes) across geographic areas."
These problems led most states to reject the locality rule.
Many state courts considered replacing the locality rule with a
national standard of care. Among the arguments offered in favor of
such a standard were that advancements in communication and
transportation made possible the mass dissemination of new
breakthroughs in medical care, so that there was no longer any
justification for holding a "backwoods" physician to a lesser standard
than a physician in a state-of-the-art urban hospital." Most courts
7 
RICHiRD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 166 (6th ed. 1995).
61 A.NI.JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons & Other Healers § 205 (1981).
Sam A. McConkey, Simpl/'ing the Law in Medical Malpractice: The Use of Practice
Guidelines as the Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 97 W. VA. L. REX. 491,
498 (1995).
1' Ste Troyen Brennan, Overview of Legal Issues, 19 JOINT COXMISSION J. ON
QUXLIIYIMPROVEMIENT 319, 321 (1993).
McConkey, supra note 39, at 498.
Se, e.g., Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 349 A.2d 245, 248-52
(Md. 1975) ("[R]ecognizing the significant developments which have occurred in the
training and practice of medicine ... a majority of American courts have now
2001 ]
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accepted the argument that medical knowledge had become more
easily accessible to rural practitioners, so that they might reasonably
be expected to keep apace of the latest developments in care.
However, these courts hesitated to adopt a flat national standard of
care because they were cognizant that the physical and financial
resources available to physicians in different localities still varied
considerably. The result was that most states opted for an
intermediate standard of care called the "similar community" rule. As
set forth in the classic case of Hall v. Hilbun, this rule requires that the
physician
use his or her knowledge [to] treat... each patient, with such
reasonable diligence, skill, competence, and prudence as are practiced
by minimally competent physicians in the same specialty or general field of
practice throughout the United States, who have available to them the
43
same general facilities, services, equipment, and options.
This standard not only requires that physicians maintain a level of
competence comparable to others in their field, but also
acknowledges that resource constraints (for example, the lack of a CT
scanner) may prevent a rural physician from being able to deliver the
state-of-the-art care she knows is practiced at resource-rich urban
hospitals.
The court's use of the words "as are practiced" in the above rule
signifies that the legal standard of care is centered upon prevailing
medical practice-that is, on custom. 4  In tort law generally, a
defendant's compliance with custom is not dispositive of a negligence
claim. Medical malpractice law, however, has evolved somewhat
differently. In other kinds of negligence cases, the Supreme Court
has declared, "What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to
be done, but what ought to be done is set by the standard of
reasonable prudence, whether it is usually complied with or not.""' In
abandoned the strict locality rule as being too narrow.").
43 466 So. 2d 856, 873 (Miss. 1985) (emphasis added), quoted in Brennan, supra
note 40, at 321; see also 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons & Other Healers § 205 (1981)
("[T]he standard... is the average standard of the profession.").
4"Custom" can be defined as "an unconscious collective agreement on how an
activity should be carried out" that "develops over time when a group of actors, acting
independently of, and often in competition with, each other, reach the same decisions
regarding the manner in which their activity should be conducted." James A.
Henderson, Jr. &John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the Continued Reliance on
Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 COMNELL L. REv. 1382, 1384-85 (1994).
45 Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468,470 (1903).
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the case of The T.J. Hoope;4' Judge Learned Hand agreed that
compliance with custom is a factor to be taken into account in
determining whether the defendant has been negligent, but does not
constitute absolute proof of non-negligence. He famously observed
that an entire industry "may have unduly lagged in the adoption of
new and available devices."' 7 Thus, industry custom may depart from
the common law negligence standard of reasonable care and
"[c] ourts must in the end say what is required."'s
The Restatement (Second) of Torts embodies this judicial
determination. ' - It notes that custom is relevant evidence of non-
negligence because it reflects a shared judgment about the optimal
level of precaution-taking, arrived at by a weighing of the risk
reduction associated with additional precautions against the costs of
those precautions." Custom, however, is not controlling on the issue
of negligence because "[c]ustoms which are entirely reasonable under
the ordinary circumstances which give rise to them may become quite
unreasonable in the light of a single fact in the particular case."5
Additionally, some customs may be unreasonable in all cases. An
industry may adhere to a custom that carries clearly excessive risk out
of a desire to save time, effort, or money.52 As the Restatement says, it is
the task of courts to recognize this as negligence; otherwise, "[i]f the
only test is to be what has always been done, no one will ever have any
great incentive to make any progress in the direction of safety."5-1
The most current discussion draft for the forthcoming Restatement
(Third) of Torts adheres to this philosophy, drawing a distinction
between "ordinary care" and "reasonable care."' That draft
acknowledges, however, that this general rule has been modified by
the courts in negligence cases involving professional customs, including
60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
17 Id. at 740.
1 Id.
J, Se RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A (1965) ("In determining whether
conduct is negligent, the customs of the community, or of others under like
circumstances, are factors to be taken into account, but are not controlling where a
rcasonable man would not follow them.").
", Id. § 295A cmt. b; cf United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
Cir. 1947) (holding that there can be no general rule of what constitutes negligent
bchadior and that the court must evaluate the probability of loss in comparison to the
cost of a precaution in determining whether an action was negligent).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS, § 295A cmt. c (1965).
Sv' id. (providing examples illustrating why custom is not always controlling).
id.
"RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 11 cmat. a (Discussion Draft 1999).
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medical malpractice cases. The draft observes that in such cases,
"professional customs tend to establish the negligence standard."
The defendant's departure from custom may serve as conclusive
evidence of negligence. At the very least, courts are likely to dismiss a
case if the plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence of the
defendant's noncompliance with custom." Although courts have
been reluctant to view a defendant's compliance with custom as
conclusive evidence of non-negligence, it is still fairly unusual for a
court to strike down a professional custom as falling short of the
57
standard of reasonable care.
One such exceptional case is the much discussed 1974
Washington case of Helling v. Carey.58 The plaintiff brought suit
against her ophthalmologists after suffering severe vision impairment
due to glaucoma. She had been under the ophthalmologists' care for
nine years and during that time had complained several times about
her deteriorating vision. The defendants never performed an eye-
pressure test to determine whether she might be afflicted with
glaucoma. Uncontroverted evidence was presented at trial showing
that the professional custom among ophthalmologists was not to
perform glaucoma tests on patients under the age of forty because
glaucoma was extremely rare in that age group. The defendants
prevailed in the lower courts, but the Washington Supreme Court
reversed, holding that in this case customary practice did not
constitute reasonable care. Because the glaucoma test was so
inexpensive and easy to administer, and could so dramatically reduce
the risk of vision damage due to glaucoma, the ophthalmology
5 Id. at § 11 cmt. c reporter's note (citing cases); see also Quintana v. United Blood
Servs., 811 P.2d 424, 427 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) ("Accordingly, in a medical malpractice
case, the conduct of the physician is measured against the accepted or customary
medical practices of similarly trained and similarly situated physicians, rather than
standards of reasonableness determined byjudges and juries." (citation omitted)), affid
827 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1992); Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 44, at 1384 ("Unlike
some areas of negligence law where the jury's wisdom or the legislature's fiat define
the standard of care, courts in medical malpractice cases have traditionally looked to
the customary practices of the medical profession as the benchmark of acceptable
behavior." (citations omitted)).
56 See FRANK A. MCCLELLAN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: LAw, TACTICS, AND ETHICS
33 (1994).
57 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 140 (1999) ("In medical matters, virtually all
courts treat conformity with practice within the profession as meeting the standard of
the reasonable physician.").
5, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974).
59 See id. at 983 (holding that the court is not bound "by the standards of the
ophthalmology profession").
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profession was negligent in failing to adopt the test as a routine
practice. Citing then-Judge Hand's opinion in The T.J Hooper," the
court made the aggressive statement that under these facts, "it is the
duty of the courts to say what is required to protect patients.,,
61
This decision was considered "radical" even by the judges who
handed it down. ; Associate Justice Utter observed in his concurring
opinion that the standard adopted by the court approached a strict
liability rule. While the majority couched its ruling in negligence
terms, Utter's position was that it was "illogical" for a court to supplant
the judgment of medical professionals as to what constitutes
reasonable care, and what the court was really doing was "imposing
liability, because, in choosing between an innocent plaintiff and a
doctor, who acted reasonably according to his specialty but who could
have prevented ... this disease.., the plaintiff should not have to
bear the risk of loss." 3 The physician, who was insured, was in a better
position to shoulder the loss.
64
Whether viewed through the lens of negligence law or as a strict
liability case, Helling represented a substantial departure from
traditional medical malpractice jurisprudence. The implications for
physicians were not lost on professional societies and malpractice
insurers. Their intensive lobbying led the Washington state legislature
to enact a statute designed to overturn Helling and reinstate the
previous, custom-based, standard of care.65 The Washington courts,
however, subsequently have construed the law as not undermining
Helling."' Thus, Washington remains atypical in its approach to
professional malpractice: A physician in Washington is afforded little
protection from tort liability by complying with the customary
practices of her colleagues.
60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
HIling, 519 P.2d at 983.
MCCLELLXN, supra note 56, at 36.
H,,lling, 519 P.2d at 984 (UtterJ., concurring).
' Id. at 985.
See WASH. RENv. CODE. § 7.70.040 (1975) (providing that a health care provider
is negligent only if she failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and learning
expected of a reasonably prudent provider in the same specialty, in the state of
Washington, acting in similar circumstances).
.&e Theodore Silver, One Hundred Years of Harmful Error: The Historical
Jurisprudence of Medical Malpractice, 1992 WIs. L. REv. 1193, 1214 (citing Harris v. Groth,
663 P.2d 113 (Wash. 1983) (holding that a health care provider must exercise the
degree of care, skill, and learning possessed, as opposed to that demonstrated, by the
average practitioner); Gates v. Jensen, 595 P.2d 919 (Wash. 1979) (same); Brown v.
Dahl, 705 P.2d 781 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (same)).
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Given that most states deem custom to constitute the standard of
care in medical malpractice cases, the question naturally arises as to
how litigants may establish what the relevant custom is in a particular
set of circumstances. For professional malpractice cases, the
testimony of an expert witness in the same field as the defendant is
required. Such experts often base their opinions entirely on their
own experience and observations. The), may, however, base their
opinions partly on written industry codes and standards that have
been promulgated either by governmental bodies or by voluntary
associations within the industry. This practice is clearly relevant to the
question of what role clinical practice guidelines, which are a type of
written industry standard, might play in malpractice litigation.
The state courts vary in their approaches to the admissibility of
industry codes and standards. 7 A large number of cases support the
view that such codes and standards are admissible, probative evidence
on the issue of the defendant's duty. Since such codes are believed to
be "objective standards representing a consensus of opinion carrying
the approval of a significant segment of an industry," they are deemed
to "contain the elements of trustworthiness and necessity which justify
an exception to the hearsay rule. "6s Courts that admit written industry
standards generally require an expert to testify as to the standards'
acceptance in the industry.69  Moreover, compliance or noncom-
pliance with the written standards is not viewed as conclusive evidence
of negligence, or the absence thereof, only as some evidence of it.'
The rationale is that while the standards indicate the prevailing
thinking in the industry about the appropriate level of precautions,
and in some cases may codify industry custom, 7' they do not rise to the
67 See Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, Admissibility in Evidence, on Issue of Negligence, (f
Codes or Standards of Safety Issued or Sponsored by Governmental Body or by Voluntay
Association, 58 A.L.R.3d 148 § 2(a), at 155 (1974) (summarizing the varying approache s
to the admissibility of safety codes or standards).
68 Id.; see also id. § 3, at 157-59 (collecting cases).
69 Id. § 2(a), at 155.
70 Id. § 2(b), at 157.
71 The discussion draft of the Restatement (Third) recognizes that written safety
codes and standards may have been written to reflect prevailing custom or may have
gained such widespread acceptance and compliance as to have established a new
custom, but implicitly acknowledges the possibility that in some cases such codes may
not represent current custom. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 11 cmt. e
(Discussion Draft 1999) ("Insofar as... the code... is shown to be the equivalent of
custom, evidence concerning the code or recommendation should be treated in
accordance with this section.").
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level of substantive law.72 Violating an industry safety standard,
therefore, is not the same thing as violating a statute, which may give
rise to an inference of per se negligence. A few courts have declined
to afford written industry standards even this degree of weight; they
have opted to make such standards inadmissible even when expert
authentication is proffered. 3
The specific views of the state courts toward the admissibility and
weight of clinical practice guidelines as evidence of the standard of
care in medical malpractice cases will be discussed shortly. Before
proceeding to that discussion, it is interesting to consider a related
issue: whether a physician may offer as a defense to a negligence
claim the fact that he complied with the decision of an HMO or other
insurer regarding medically necessary and appropriate care in a
particular case. The answer appears to be no. In the case of Wickline
v. California,7' a California court held that a physician may not
abdicate his duty to adhere to the professional standard of care merely
because an insurer has declined to cover the medical services required
to satisfT that standard. The case involved a patient covered by the
California state Medicaid program ("Medi-Cal"). Following vascular
surgery on her leg, the patient developed complications that led her
treating physicians to decide that she required a longer hospital stay
than was typically authorized by Medi-Cal. However, Medi-Cal denied
their request for an extension of her stay. The patient was discharged
and subsequently developed additional complications that
necessitated the amputation of her leg. The patient sued Medi-Cal for
negligently requiring the physician to discharge her despite her
medical need for additional hospital days. 75
The jury found in favor of the patient and the State appealed.
The appellate court found for Medi-Cal on the narrow ground that
the physician in charge, after receiving word of Medi-Cal's decision,
ultimately had decided that it would not violate the standard of care
or the patient's best interest to discharge her promptly. This
judgment was uncontested at trial. Medi-Cal was not negligent
Feld, supra note 67, §2(b); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oF TORTs § 11 cmt. C
(Discussion Draft 1999) ("[B]ecause it is issued by a private body, the actor's
compliance with or departure from the code does not call into play the rules relating
to xiolation of and compliance with public enactments ....").
7_ Se RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs § 11 cmt. e, reporter's note (Discussion
Draft 1999) (collecting cases).
239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1986).
Set' id. at 812-17.
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because it did not coerce this decision or override the medical
76
judgment of the physician.
Although the physicians involved in the decision were not named
as defendants in the case, the appellate court seized the opportunity
to issue a warning to physicians: The duty to ensure that a patient
receives appropriate care rests squarely with the physician, regardless
of the coverage decisions of the patient's insurer. The court
admonished,
the physician who complies without protest with the limitations imposed
by a third party payor, when his medical judgment dictates otherwise,
cannot avoid his ultimate responsibility for his patient's care. He cannot
point to the health care payor as the liability scapegoat when the
consequences of his own determinative medical decisions go sour.77
Thus, one cannot look to health care payers to set either the
medical or the legal standard of care for medical practice. The
Wickline decision bears on the debate over the role of CPGs in
malpractice litigation because it suggests that compliance with
guidelines issued by HMOs or other insurers may not constitute a
valid affirmative defense for a physician whose management of the
patient resulted in injury.78
With these basic principles and precedents of medical malpractice
law in mind, it is now appropriate to turn to an examination of the
current uses of CPGs in malpractice litigation.
C. Roles of CPGs in Malpractice Litigation
This sub-Part addresses four questions relating to the current uses
of CPGs: First, what are the rules governing their admissibility in
evidence? Secondly, what weight do courts give CPGs on the issue of
negligence? Thirdly, how (and how frequently) are CPGs currently
being used? Finally, what effect has the use of CPGs had on medical
76 See id. at 819-20 ("Medi-Cal did not override the medical judgment of [the]
treating physicians .... [t]herefore, there can be no viable cause of action against it
for the consequences of that discharge decision.").
77 Id. at 819.
78 Although irckline dealt specifically with an insurer decision issued
contemporaneously with the patient's care, the reasoning underlying the decision would
seem to apply with equal force to an insurer coverage decision issued ex ante in the
form of a practice guideline. Both kinds of insurer decisions raise the same issues: the
financial incentives insurers face to stint on care and the physician's duty to serve as an
advocate of his patient's best interest, which arises from the nature of the physician-
patient relationship.
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malpractice litigation?
CPGs, like other kinds of evidence, are subject to the admissibility
requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence and applicable state
and local evidence rules. In order to be admissible on a particular
point, CPGs must satisfy the evidentiary requirements of relevance,
authenticity, and reliability. Evidence is relevant if it has "any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the deternination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence."'' CPGs will be considered relevant
evidence of the standard of care only if they actually represent the
legal standard of care for a particular medical condition or procedure
a tid that medical condition or procedure was applicable to the
particular clinical interaction at issue."' The authenticity of the
guidelines is established by having an expert testify that the guidelines
are accurate representations of what the), purport to be.
Establishing the reliability of the guidelines requires addressing
their status as hearsay evidence.8' Because they are out-of-court
statements, CPGs will be considered inadmissible hearsay unless the
party offering them can demonstrate that they fall within one of the
exceptions to the hearsay rule. The most commonly invoked
exception is the learned treatise rule, which provides for the
admissibility of "statements contained in public treatises, periodicals,
or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or
art" when "established as a reliable authority" by the testimony of an
82expert witness or by judicial notice. However, there exists some
,FED. R. Evil. 401.
S,"e Gary XV. Kuc, Practice Parameters as a Shield Against Physician Liability, 10 J.
CONTiEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 439, 462-63 (1994) (noting that "the key issue [is]
whether the practice parameters apply to the facts of the case rather than whether
[they] set forth valid standards of care")., Su' FED. R. EvID. 801-805. The Federal Rules define "hearsay" as "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Id. Rule 801(c). Hearsay is
inadmissible evidence, see id. Rule 802, unless it falls within one of a number of specific
exceptions, see id. Rule 803, 804.
Id. Rule 803(18). There are some limitations imposed on the use of learned
treatise evidence: It may be read into evidence but may not be used as an exhibit. See
THOwAS A. NLUET & WARREN D. WVOLFSON, TRIAL EVIDENCE 226 (1997) (discussing
the use of such a treatise on direct examination). Moreover, some states' rules of
evidence (though not the Federal Rules) stipulate that it may only be admitted if
called to the attention of the expert on cross-examination. In such states, the expert
would not be permitted to base her testimony on direct examination of the CPGs. See
Kuc, supra note 80, at 463-64 (discussing limitations upon the "learned treatises"
exception).
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controversy over whether CPGs qualify as learned treatises. The court
in the Kentucky case of Davenport v. Ephraim McDowell Memorial
Hospita 3 refused to consider the proffered professional society CPGs
a learned treatise, though it admitted the guidelines anyway. Whether
a CPG will be deemed a learned treatise turns on its authoritativeness,
which depends on which body issued it. A learned treatise
must have been written primarily by professionals in the field for fellow
professionals. It must have been subject to scrutiny and exposure for
inaccuracy by some kind of peer review process, with the reputation of
the writer at stake. It is "reliable" for purposes of the rule when it is
recognized as authoritative in the relevant discipline. The literature and
its author, not just the journal they appear in, must be established as
authoritative."
Some commentators have suggested that CPGs meet the
requirements for learned treatises because they usually appear in
peer-reviewed journals,8 but the above definition suggests that the
offeror must show more than this. 6 He must also show that the body
promulgating the guidelines is a well-respected medical authority and
that the process through which the guidelines were developed and
updated was sound.
While there are cases in which courts have spurned efforts to get
CPGs admitted as learned treatises, there appears to be a trend
towards admitting them, subject to the satisfaction of the above
requirements. Courts are increasingly willing to allow the use of all
kinds of professional standards as learned treatises87 and to entertain
expert testimony that essentially amounts to a review of the scientific
literature.88 The 1993 Supreme Court decision in Dauber! v. Merrell
83 769 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988), cited in Peter D. Jacobson, Legal and Polici
Considerations in Using Clinical Practice Guidelines, 80 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 74H, 75H
(1997).
84 MAUET & WOLFSON, supra note 82, at 225-26.
85 See Troyen A. Brennan, Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation: Collision or
Cohesion?, 16J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y& L. 67, 75 (1991) ("Since practice guidelines are
relevant and since they usually appear in peer-reviewed journals or other accepted
authorities, it seems very likely that a plaintiff's or defendant's expert will be able to
testify citing such practice guidelines .... ").
Cf Franklin M. Zweig & Hazel A. Witte, Assisting Judges in Screening Medical
Practice Guidelines for Health Care Litigation, 19 JOINT COMMISSION J. ON QLAILI-I'
IMPROVEMENT 342, 349 (1993) (observing that peer review is merely one of several
indicators judges may apply in evaluating the reliability of scientific evidence).
87 See Andrew L. Hyams et al., Medical Practice Guidelines in Malpractice Litigation:
An Early Retrospective, 21 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 289, 293 (1996) (discussing the
use of guidelines during the pre-trial stages of litigation).
8, Brennan, supra note 85, at 75.
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Dow Pharizaceuticals, Iic., " however, may affect this trend. Dauber
created a new analytical framework for the judicial evaluation of the
reliability and authoritativeness of proffered scientific evidence. It is
perhaps too earl), tojudge the impact of Dauber on the admissibility of
CPGs, but one possible effect may be that judges will more closely
scrutinize the procedures through which the guidelines were
developed and the credentials and motivations of the organization
that promulgated the guidelines.
Assuming that a court is willing to admit CPGs as evidence of the
standard of care, what weight will it give this evidence? The prevailing
practice is to admit CPGs in connection with expert testimony, but not
to give them determinative weight. "  Thus, CPGs constitute some
evidence of the legal standard of care, but are thrown into the pot
along with other kinds of evidence-for example, opposing expert
testimony based on the expert's own experience and observation.
The jury is free to decide which evidence is most persuasive.92 "Thus,
under the current majority of state law, practice guidelines have the
same effect as an), other learned treatise: a tool for expert witnesses.'
However, many courts have gone so far as to recognize CPGs offered
by the plaintiff as establishing a rebuttable presumption of the
standard of care, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. The
defendant then may rebut the presumption by showing that the
guidelines were not applicable to the particular facts of the case. 4
509 U.S. 579 (1993). In Daubert, the Supreme Court altered its approach to the
admissibility of scientific evidence. Previously, under the rule announced in Frye v.
'nit, d Stat s, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), overruled by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993), scientific evidence was admitted only if the scientific
principle underlying it had gained "general acceptance" in the scientific community.
Danbr shifted the responsibility for admission from the scientific community to the
trial judge, imposing upon judges a duty to serve as gatekeepers and evaluate scientific
cidence based on a range of factors. General acceptance continues to be a relevant
consideration, but attention is also paid to whether the evidence was derived from a
rigorous application of the scientific method. Daubert is only binding on the federal
courts, but many states have opted to follow its approach. MAUET & WOLFSON, supra
note 82, at 277.- St Zweig & Witte, supra note 86, at 349 (noting that "[slince validity and
rcliability-the strength of evidence-are a fundamental element [sic] in clinical
practice guidelines, judges' duty to screen may require them to appraise the strength
of guidelines evidence")."I Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice
I t1atZof, L. & CO\NrEMP. PROBS., Winter & Spring 1991, at 119, 131 & n.53.
Rinella, supra note 15, at 351.
McConkey, supra note 39, at 516.
Ste Kapp, supra note 27, at 498 (noting that defendants have been able to meet
this burden of proof in many cases).
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How are CPGs currently being used: as inculpatory evidence
offered by plaintiffs to show that the physician deviated from the
standard of care, or as exculpatory evidence offered by defendants to
show compliance with the standard? The available empirical evidence
is limited, but suggests that the guidelines are being used both ways.
The most reliable study on this topic is that performed by Andrew
Hyarns, of the Harvard School of Public Health, and his colleagues,
who reviewed records at two professional liability insurance
companies and interviewed 578 personal injury attorneys rather than
relying on published judicial opinions.0 ' The researchers concluded
that the use of CPGs in malpractice litigation is a "two-way street. '
The study determined that, overall, CPGs are used in malpractice
cases infrequently, though their use may be increasing.97 Forty-eight
percent of the personal injury attorneys surveyed reported having had
at least one case per year in which CPGs had played a role, but only
36% had had one case per year in which they played an "important"
role.98 Only 17 of the 259 insurance claims reviewed, or 6.6%, involved
the use of practice guidelines.9 Of these 17, 12 were cases in which
the guidelines had been used for inculpatory purposes, 4 were cases of
exculpatory use, and 1 was indeterminable. Thus, in this sample,
the guidelines were used as inculpatory evidence at three times the
rate of their exculpatory use. The guidelines most often used were
those issued by professional societies, individual hospitals, and the
Joint Commission for Accreditation of Health Care Organizations. "
Other research has indicated that guidelines promulgated by health
care payers do not carry the same weight in litigation as guidelines
issued by these organizations."2
95 See Andrew L. Hyams et al., Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation: A Two-
Way Street, 122 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 450, 451-52 (1995) (noting that published
judicial opinions represent less than one percent of all suits brought).
96 See Hyams et al., supra note 87, at 291 (noting that CPGs have been used "as
potentially compelling evidence to support either side's case").
See Hyams et al., supra note 95, at 453 (reporting that 178 of the 578 attorneys
surveyed believed guideline use to be increasing, while only 7 thought it was
decreasing).
q8 Id.
99 Id. at 452.
100 Id.
1 See id. at 453 ("The leading sources of guidelines were the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (28.4%), hospital procedures and protocols (22.7%),
the Joint Commission for Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (6.8%) and the
American Medical Association (6.8%).").
1o2 See Leonard Berlin, Standard of Care, 170 AM. J. RADIOLOGY 275, 277 (1998)
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Hyams's survey of attorneys suggests that while the use of CPGs in
litigation is relatively rare, CPGs do have some impact on the kinds of
malpractice cases that are brought and their eventual outcomes.
Twenty-seven percent of attorneys surveyed indicated that a CPG had
influenced their decision to settle a case and 22% believed that a
guideline had influenced a trier of fact in a case in the past year.13
Moreover, 26% of plaintiffs' attorneys reported that CPGs had
influenced, at least once in the previous year, their decision not to
take a case, and 31% said that a guideline influenced their decision to
bring a case." Based on this evidence, the researchers speculated
that the use of guidelines may help plaintiffs' attorneys (and
presumably also judges) separate out frivolous malpractice claims
from meritorious ones.L5 By making it easier to determine whether
the facts of a particular case indicate a deviation from the standard of
care and to prove that issue in a trial, CPGs also may encourage more
plaintiffs and their attorneys to press fonvard with meritorious cases.""
Since empirical research has demonstrated that the number of
malpractice claims brought represents only a tiny fraction of the
actual number of instances of medical malpractice, 1"7 this result would
be desirable from the standpoint of compensation.
Building on this empirical evidence, which suggests that CPGs
may perform useful functions in litigation but are currently used only
infrequently, tort reformers have offered a range of proposals for
increasing the role of CPGs in malpractice cases. The next sub-Part
examines these reform efforts and the problems associated with each.
(citing Levine v. Rosen, 616 A.2d 623 (Pa. 1992)).
10 Hyarns et al., supra note 95, at 453.
"'Id.
S', id. at 454 ("When physicians comply with guidelines, the exculpatory value
of those guidelines will likely dissuade plaintiffs' attorneys from bringing cases.").
1S11 id. ("When physicians fail to comply, plaintiff's [sic] attorneys will use the
gtuidelines as evidence of negligence."); see also Garnick et al., supra note 4, at 2858 ("If
guidelines serve to define malpractice more precisely, some meritorious cases that are
not curTently pursued will be identifiable.").
0,,7 SPAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE 69 (1993) (citing a
Han ard Medical Practice Study, which found that in 1984, in New York State, only 1
malpractice claim was filed for every 7 medical injuries to patients resulting from
negligence). A large proportion of these lawsuits-around 85%-represented claims
by pers;ons who did not actually suffer an injury due to negligence. See Brennan, supra
note 85, at 69. When individual malpractice claims were matched to medical records,
the researchers found that only 1% to 2% of patients who actually suffered a negligent
injury filed a lawsuit. WEILER ET AL., supra, at 72-73.
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D. Tort Reform Proposals Involving CPGs
Proposals advanced to date for giving CPGs a greater role in
medical malpractice litigation can be grouped into three categories.
One group of reformers advocates requiring physicians and/or
patients to enter into contracts ex ante to recognize a set of guidelines
as constituting a binding standard of care. A second group has
proposed that courts take judicial notice of CPGs as the standard of
care, with deviations therefrom conclusively establishing negligence.
A third group, by far the most influential, urges that compliance ith
CPGs should constitute an affirmative defense for physicians, but that
deviations from CPGs should not be used as inculpatory evidence.
These three approaches are each reviewed in turn.
1. The Contract Model
One of the most notable trends in American medicine in the last
fifteen years is the increasing prominence of contracting in the
provision of health care. With the rise of managed care, the typical
physician's practice has evolved into a nexus of contracts between the
physician and multiple managed care organizations. Patients select
and contract with a health plan and then choose from among a
restricted number of physicians who have contracts with the plan.
Thus, physicians and patients contract formally with health plans and
informally with each other. Physicians and health plans also contract
with liability insurers to insure against risks incident to their
relationships with patients.
Tort reformers have seized upon the possibility of using this web
of contracts as a vehicle for incorporating CPGs into medical practice.
The idea of this contract model of reform is that the parties to these
contracts could agree ex ante that a certain set of practice guidelines
will define the parameters of their relationship. Thus, the contract
between a malpractice insurer and a physician might state that
coverage for a particular dispute will only be forthcoming if the
physician's conduct complied with the relevant CPG. Alternatively,
the insurer might grade the premiums it charges the physician
according to the physician's stated willingness, at the time of
contracting, to comply with a range of CPGs.0 8 The contract between
108This reform has already been adopted in some states, including Utah and
Colorado, for practice areas such as obstetrics, anesthesia, and breast cancer diagnosis.
Kapp, supra note 27, at 497.
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a physician and an HMO might also make the physician's
participation in the plan conditional upon her continued compliance
with CPGs adopted by the HMO.
Going a step further, physicians might even enter into written
contracts with patients at the time of rendering care (for example,
before performing a surgery or screening the patient for cancer),
adopting a particular set of guidelines as the legal standard of care
should any dispute arise in the future.'" HMOs might do the same
with their insureds when an individual signs on with a particular plan.
This proposal recognizes that guidelines differ in the extent to which
they are driven by cost and quality of care concerns, and asserts that
the inclusion of CPGs in physician-patient or HMO-patient contracts
would serve "as a potential vehicle for finally enfranchising consumers
to choose the style of medical care that best suits their preferences
and their pocketbooks."'W
The proposal for including CPGs in contracts between patients
and physicians, or between patients and managed care organizations,
is certainly the most controversial in the contract model of reform.
The proposal suffers from the same weaknesses as many other recent
health care proposals based on the idea of "consumer choice": the
problems of imperfect information, imperfect rationality, and
imperfect freedom of choice. The idea that an individual consumer
uiith no medical training could competently compare the clinical
practice guidelines adopted by different health plans and physicians,
accurately gauging their medical appropriateness and cost-
effectiveness, borders on the absurd. Proponents of the contract
model respond to this objection by suggesting that only those CPGs
that have been "certified" by the federal government as meeting
minimum standards should be used."' This might eliminate the
lowest-quality guidelines, but would still leave a range of CPGs for
consumers to evaluate and choose among. Most consumers simply do
not have the requisite information and training to be able to perform
this task.
Even if consumers could obtain and comprehend this
J- S, Havighurst, supra note 7, at 108 ("Instead of defining the obligations of
health care professionals in universal terms, the law might contemplate that the
phsician's duty in a given malpractice case might be found in the contract between
the ph sician and the patient.").
Id. at I13.
S d. at 114-16 (noting that federal certification would "give greater reliability
and credibility to consumers' economizing choices").
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information, this proposal would still be vulnerable to a consumer
rationality critique. Consumer choice theory assumes that consumers
will choose the affordable bundle of goods and services that
maximizes their utility."2 This, in turn, is based on an assumption that
individuals are rational utility maximizers. There is a considerable
body of literature questioning this premise. Consumers may have
tastes for health care products that do not actually maximize their
utility."3 For example, with regard to tastes for different health plans,
consumers may prefer to stay in their current plan simply because it is
what they are used to, regardless of the fact that an objective analysis
would reveal that another plan would serve their needs better. Choice
experiments also suggest that decision utilities may be extremely
myopic, focusing on the utility associated with transactions rather than
with long-term outcomes."4 Consumers also may be unable to predict
the results of their choices,"1 may "overweight outcomes that are
considered certain, relative to outcomes that are merely probable,""'
and may display inconsistent preferences by disregarding components
that the alternatives have in common and focusing on the ways in
which they differ." 7 As a result of such dynamics, consumers may not
act as rational utility maximizers and a competitive marketplace in
which consumers act on their preferences may not actually make
people better off.
Finally, the contract model of reform fails to acknowledge the
limited range of consumers' choices in health care. Consumers who
are fortunate enough to have employer-sponsored health insurance
(if they are given a choice of health plans at all) typically are
12 See generally KENNETHJ. ARROw, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RIsK-BEARING 177-210 (1971) (applying consumer
choice theory to the demand for health insurance).
13 See Thomas Rice, Can Markets Give Us the Health System We Want?, 22 J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & L. 383, 404-11 (1997) (disputing the applicability of the core
assumptions of consumer choice theory to the health care market).
See Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, 150 J.
INsrrrunONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 18, 18 (1994) ("[Pleople are myopic in their
decisions, may lack skill in predicting their future tastes, and can be led to erroneous
choices by fallible memory and incorrect evaluation of past experiences.").
Rice, supra note 113, at 407.
16 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theoy: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 265 (1979).
117 See id. at 271 ("This approach to the choice problems may produce inconsistent
preferences, because a pair of prospects can be decomposed into common and
distinctive components in more than one way, and different decompositions
sometimes lead to different preferences.").
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presented ith only two or three plan options. The sometimes-large
differences in premium rates among plans may restrict the range of
choices even further for workers whose budgets are tight. Consumers
in the indidual insurance market also face a very restricted range of
choices among health plans, because individual-plan premiums are so
exorbitant that most individuals are lucky if they can find a single plan
whose rates they can afford to pay. The HMO choices available to
individuals who receive their coverage through Medicaid and
Medicare vary widely from state to state and locality to locality." '
Once in a health plan, individuals must choose a primary physician
from among the limited number with whom their health plan has
contracts, and may be given very little information about the different
physicians.
For all of these reasons, the idea that consumers could, in a
voluntary and informed fashion, enter into ex ante contracts with
managed care organizations or physicians accepting a particular set of
CPGs as the legal standard of care that will govern their relationship is
extremely problematic. The informational asymmetries are less of a
concern in the contracting between physicians and managed care
plans and between physicians and liability insurers, although those
bargaining relationships, too, are unequal. Physicians may have little
choice but to contract with a particular managed care organization,
and accept its CPGs, if that HMO controls a significant market share
in the physician's area. There may be a limited number of liability
insurers willing to take the physician on as an insured, particularly if
the physician has had malpractice problems in the past. In addition,
the physician may reside in a state in which all the liability insurers
have adopted the same set of CPGs,"9 leaving the physician with no
choice at all. These realities depart significantly from contract model
reformers' vision of a "pluralistic" market in which contracting parties
choose the best set of guidelines from among many competing
options1 2 "
11" State Medicaid rules may severely restrict recipients' ability to choose among
managed care plans. Medicare beneficiaries in urban areas may have a wide array of
HMOs from which to choose, but those in rural areas may find that only one HMO
Nerves their area, or none at all.
This is the situation in Utah, where the Utah Medical Insurance Association has
adopted obstetrical standards, modeled on those of the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, that are mandatory for all insured physicians. See
Kapp, supra note 27, at 497 (noting the incentives for, and examples of, private
insurers setting standards).
1' S, Ha-ighurst, supra note 7, at 113 (envisioning "a range of meaningful, well-
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2. The Judicial Notice Model
The second model of reform that has emerged from the academic
commentary on CPGs proposes that courts take judicial notice of
CPGs as representing the legal standard of care.121 Judicial notice is
the acceptance by the court of certain facts without requiring the
party who bears the burden of proof to produce evidence proving
those facts." Under this model, with the help of an impartial, court-
retained medical expert, the bench would identify a set of guidelines
that is both authoritative and applicable to the conduct at issue in the
litigation, and adopt the CPGs as the standard of care. At trial, the
plaintiff would thus be relieved of the burden of establishing the
physician's duty. The proof at trial would focus on the other three
elements of a negligence claim: whether the physician breached the
standard of care, whether the plaintiff suffered an injury, and whether
the physician's negligence was the proximate cause of that injury. '
Substantiating breach of duty requires proof that the physician
deviated from the procedures outlined in the practice guidelines. In
this way, the judicial notice approach resembles the doctrine of per se
negligence, which holds that violations of certain safety statutes
constitute negligence as a matter of law.
2 4
considered options... developed in a pluralistic environment").
121 Hall, supra note 91, at 129-31; Leahy, supra note 7, at 1522; Rinella, supra note
15, at 352.
122 See Rinella, supra note 15, at 352 (outlining the theory of judicial notice in
medical malpractice litigation). Judicial notice is governed by Rule 201 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which provides that "[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready,
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned."
FED. R. EVID. 201 (b).
123 Elba Wood Prods., Inc. v. Brackin, 356 So. 2d 119, 122 (Ala. 1978).
124 See, e.g., Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920) (holding that the
defendant's failure to install headlights on his buggy as required by statute "is more
than some evidence of negligence. It is negligence in itself."). While most state courts
hold that violation of a safety statute is conclusive proof on the negligence issue,
precluding rebuttal by other evidence, a minority have held that such violation only
creates a presumption of negligence, or constitutes evidence of negligence. See DxN, B.
DOBBS, TORTs AND COMPENSATION 141 (2d ed. 1993) (citing California, Michigan, and
Washington as examples). The per se negligence rule has not previously been applied
to industry standards or other forms of private regulation. Accordingly, bringing CPGS
within the ambit of the rule would represent a significant extension of the rule. See
Brennan, supra note 85, at 77 (differentiating practice guidelines and per se
negligence); Edward B. Hirshfeld, Practice Parameters and the Malpractice Liability of
Physicians, 263 JAMA 1556, 1560 (1990) (discussing the evidentiary weight of the
guidelines and the concern that they might be used as a form of per se negligence).
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Proponents of this view assert that the standard of care should
remain ajury question where no reliable CPGs have been established,
but that where authoritative guidelines do exist, "allowing a jury to
undermine that standard is not only bad policy, but can lead to
irrational results."'12 Among their strongest arguments are that:
First, practice guidelines are prospectively determined. As a result, they
will be much more objective and reliable than ajury's assessment of the
opinion of a hired expert considering a case retrospectively.
... [RIetrospective evaluations by hired experts, in view of
undesirable outcomes, may often cause a jury to focus on perfect care
rather than customary or reasonable care....
Second, practice guidelines represent well-considered opinions of
expert panels, based upon reviews of the best available data, as to how
physicians should approach certain clinical problems. The prospective
deliberations and consensus of such a panel are much more likely to be
impartial and reliable than jury decisions based upon the testimony of
indidual experts paid to render an opinion after the fact.
126
There are several responses that might be made to such
arguments. First, as is discussed in greater depth in Part II of this
Article, CPGs themselves may represent an ideal of optimal care,
rather than prevailing medical custom. Thus, using CPGs as the
judicially-noticed standard of care may involve no less a "focus on
perfect care" than using jury determinations of the standard.
Secondly, while practice guidelines do "represent well-considered
opinions of expert panels," their application to any particular case
does not. A determination as to the applicability of the guidelines to
the case at hand will be made by thejudge. Proponents of the judicial
notice model argue that judges are better situated to make this
determination than juries because they "have more experience with
medical malpractice cases and the standard of care concept" andc.127
because they are more likely to ask appropriate questions of experts.
Judges certainly are more sophisticated than juries in matters of law,
but their experience on the bench does not provide them with any
medical expertise that could be parlayed into a determination of
whether a particular set of CPGs fit a particular clinical situation12
Judges would retain an impartial medical expert to render an opinion
Leahy, supra note 7, at 1500.
Id. at 1506.
1 7 Id. at 1527.
Se id. at 1505 ('judges obviously lack the requisite medical expertise to identify
and critically exaluate the data relevant to such decisions [as the standard of care].").
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on this issue, and base their decision on her opinion. The question
then becomes whether reliance on a single "impartial" expert opinion
is preferable to evaluating competing opinions offered by two or more
experts hired by the litigants. This issue is taken up in greater depth
in Part III of this Article, but for the moment it might briefly be noted
that our adversarial system is grounded in the assumption that the
truth is more likely to emerge from the clash of opposing sides than
from a report by an "impartial" investigator.
A third problem with the judicial notice model is that, as even its
advocates acknowledge, it would only be practicable where there has
emerged a single set of guidelines that medical practitioners
recognize as authoritative and controlling. This limitation arises from
the requirement of Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence that the
fact to be judicially noticed must be "not subject to reasonable
dispute" because it is established by either common knowledge or
"sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned."'1 Given
that there currently exist over 1600 different practice guidelines, it
seems unlikely that only a single set could reasonably be claimed to
apply in any given case. Additionally, the American Medical
Association has taken the position that the "state of the art" with
respect to CPGs is not advanced enough to move to the judicial notice
model.' 30 There are too many issues yet to be resolved with respect to
the content of CPGs, the evidence underlying them, and the auspices
and procedures under which they are developed to afford them this
degree of weight in legal proceedings. The science of guideline
development has not progressed to the point where we have produced
documents "whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." As a
result, proposals forjudicial notice are premature at best.
3. The Maine Model
The third major model of tort reform involving CPGs involves the
creation of an affirmative defense 3' for physicians who can
demonstrate compliance with applicable practice guidelines. This
129FED. R. EvID. 201 (b).
130 See Ed Hirshfeld, Use of Practice Parameters as Standards of Care and in Health Care
Reform: A View from the American Medical Association, 19 JOINT COMMISSION J. ON
QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 322, 323 (1993) (explaining the AMA position that CPGs
should only be evidence for the standard of care); Rosoff, supra note 25, at 384.
131 An affirmative defense is a "defendant's assertion raising new facts and
arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff's or prosecution's claim, even if all
allegations in the complaint are true." BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 430 (7th ed. 1999).
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approach has become known as the "Maine model" because that state
adopted it as a statutory demonstration project in 1990.32 This
approach might also be thought of as creating a "one-way street" for
practice guidelines as it permits their exculpatory use by defendants
but not their inculpatory use by plaintiffs.
The Maine statute limits the malpractice liability of physicians in
four specialty areas who voluntarily agree to follow established CPGs
adopted pursuant to the project. 3  The State adopted twenty practice
guidelines in anesthesiology, emergency medicine, obstetrics and
gynecology, and radiology. Physicians who follow the guidelines when
the clinical situation so mandates may invoke their compliance as an
absolute affirmative defense against medical malpractice claims
accruing between January 1, 1992 and December 31, 1996.'m The
statute further provides that plaintiffs are completely precluded from
introducing CPGs as evidence at trial, whether the defendant
physician is participating in the demonstration project or not:1 The
plaintiff may, however, challenge whether a CPG introduced by the
physician is applicable to the clinical situation at issue and whether
the physician did, in fact, comply with the guideline.'"  Maine's
approach has been emulated by Florida37 and Kentucky.'
IME. REV. STAT. Aa N. tit. 24, §§ 2971-2979 (West 2000). For a detailed
discussion of the Maine project, see Jennifer Begel, Maine Physician Practice Guidelines:
Implications for Medical Malpractice Litigation, 47 ME. L. REv. 69 (1995).
,See Rinella, supra note 15, at 342-43 (outlining the structure of the Maine
demonstration project).
' ' Se id. at 343.
J--. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2977 (West 2000) (setting out the
admissibility of the practice parameters as evidence).
P" Spe id. § 2975(2) (delegating the burden of proof for compliance with
parameters).
1,7 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.02 (West Supp. 1998) (setting out the statutory
practice parameter guidelines). For a summary of Florida's project, see Trail & Allen,
supra note 24, at 245-47 (noting that Florida's project contains the same basic structure
as the Maine Project, the only critical difference being the admissibility of the
guidelines by the plaintiff). Importantly, unlike the Maine statute, the Florida statute
does not restrict a plaintiff's ability to introduce CPGs into evidence. See id. at 246
(noting the absence of a provision limiting a plaintiffs use of the guidelines in
litigation). Guidelines offered by a plaintiff in Florida provide evidence of the
standard of care, but do not conclusively establish it. Noncompliance with CPGs does
not create a prima facie case of negligence. Id. at 247.
I SeeK REV. STAT. A,\,. § 342.035(8) (Michie 1997) (authorizing the
commissioner to develop practice parameters). While Maine's law provides physicians
with an absolute affirmative defense, Kentucky's law provides only a presumption that a
ph)sician who complied uith the relevant CPG met the legal standard of care. See id. at
.§ 342.035(8) (b) (authorizing a presumption of legal compliance where the guidelines
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"One-way street" reforms, like the other models of reform
discussed earlier, seek to clarify the standard of care in medical
malpractice claims and simplify litigation. The statutory language and
academic commentary surrounding Maine-model reforms, however,
place unique emphasis on a second motive: inducing greater
physician compliance with CPGs.39 It is thought that providing
physicians with a safe harbor in malpractice litigation will give them
strong incentives to comply with practice guidelines. This will result
in societal gains in the form of higher quality care and reduced
defensive medicine.
The empirical evidence reported to date suggests that the
program has not succeeded in achieving these goals.'" A study of
outcomes in obstetrics and gynecology found neither appreciable
improvements in rates of three pregnancy-related conditions (failure
to progress, fetal distress, and prolonged pregnancy) nor any
significant declines in caesarean section rates attributable to the
demonstration project.14 ' A survey of Maine physicians conducted as
part of the study revealed that only a small percentage of the
physicians believed that the CPGs had had an effect on caesarean
section rates, defensive medicine practices, or malpractice risk."'
Studies published as of December 1997 indicate that CPG compliance
has been invoked as an affirmative defense in only one case in Maine
since the adoption of the demonstration project,4 3 so the impact of
the project on litigation costs and litigation outcomes is uncertain at
best.
In addition to these efficacy concerns, Maine-model reforms also
raise fundamental questions of fairness. The effect of this model is to
have been complied with).
131 See Rinella, supra note 15, at 342-43 (outlining the structure of the Maine
demonstration project); Trail & Allen, supra note 24, at 251, 254 (discussing the
general benefits of the guidelines and the goals at which they are aimed).
140 It must be remembered, however, that the project is limited in scope, involving
CPGs which affect only four specialties and only certain areas within those specialties.
By one estimate, the guidelines affect only about three to four percent of medical
practice in Maine. See Gordon H. Smith, A Case Study in Progress: Practice Guideline5 and
theAffirmativeDefense in Alaine, 19JoiNT CoMMISSIONJ. ON QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 355,
361 (1993) (assessing the results of the demonstration project).
141 See Ronald D. Deprez, The Affirmative Defense-Does It Have an Impact on Physician
Compliance?, 22 JoiNT COM.MISSION J. ON QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 567, 567-68 (1996)
(outlining the preliminary results of the demonstration project).
142 See id. at 568.
143 See Matthews, supra note 15, at 300 (stressing the difficult), in establishing
practice guidelines as a legal standard).
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situate the plaintiff and the defendant in a malpractice case differently
with respect to the evidence each may use to build her case. There
are several objections that may be raised to this anomalous one-way
use of relevant, probative evidence. These concerns are set forth in
Part III.
4. Future Directions for Reform
The three reform models described above all proceed from the
premise that CPGs should figure more prominently in malpractice
litigation, and the models should employ a variety of mechanisms to
achieve that goal. The contract-model and judicial-notice-model
reforms assume that it is legitimate and valuable for the use of CPGs
in litigation to be a two-way street. Maine-model reformers recognize
that there may be persuasive reasons not to allow the inculpatory use
of CPGs, but contend that we should still allow their one-way,
exculpatory use. The remainder of this Article takes issue with these
assertions. It is argued, first, that indeed there are very compelling
reasons not to permit the inculpatory use of CPGs, at least in the way
the reformers envision; and, second, that permitting this evidence to
be used only by defendants requires a strong policy justification,
which is lacking. As a consequence, it is untenable to argue that CPGs
should assume a more prominent role in litigation either as a two-way
street or as a one-way street.
II. THE INCULPATORY USE OF CPGs: LEAVING CUSTOM BEHIND
Those who favor the increased inculpatory use of CPGs provide an
impressive array of policy reasons to do so: to reduce uncertainty, to
reduce defensive medicine, to weed out unmeritorious claims, to
promote compliance with CPGs, and to improve the quality of care.
'What is notably absent from these reformers' accounts, however, is an
examination of exactly what CPGs are supposed to represent.
Specifically, do CPGs represent prevailing medical custom, or do they
represent an ideal standard of care toward which the medical
profession should strive? If the latter, is it appropriate to use the tort
law-the legal standard of care-to pull up the medical standard of
care? I will argue that the answer to both questions is no.
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A. The Relationship Between CPGs and Prevailing Medical Practice
1. Are CPGs Meant to Represent Custom?
A review of the medical and legal literature on practice guidelines
leaves one highly uncertain as to whether CPGs are meant to
represent current medical custom or an ideal standard of care. One
appeals court characterized the well-established guidelines
promulgated by the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists ("ACOG") merely as "the minimal accepted standards
for [the physician's] specialty." 44 Academic commentators, too, have
described CPGs as a "minimum" or "quality baseline," stressing that
they should be "realistic" and embody "conduct with which the
medical profession is capable of complying ordinarily."'" Under this
view, CPGs do represent prevailing custom.
In contrast, a District of Columbia court of appeals held that the
standards of the American Association of Anesthesiology were not
necessarily "mandatory" because they were "emerging" and
"encouraged.""6 Other courts and commentators have suggested that
CPGs represent an ideal of care that may or may not be possible to
implement. The North Dakota District Court, for example, noted that
geographic and resource constraints facing rural hospitals may make
it infeasible to adhere to the ACOG guidelines in some areas of the
country.'4 7 Clark Havighurst has commented that most guidelines will
"rarely even purport to be probative of custom as such.""'
Some commentators have distinguished between newly minted
and well-established guidelines, arguing that some, but not all, CPGs
represent prevailing medical custom. With respect to guidelines that
advocate the use of new high-tech equipment, for example,
14 Jewett v. Our Lady of Mercy Hosp., 612 N.E.2d 724, 726-27 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992) (emphasis added).
1- Kapp, supra note 27, at 498 (emphasis added); see also Ray Fish & Melvin
Ehrhardt, The Standard of Care, 12J. EMERGENCY MED. 545, 547 (1994) ("The fact that a
proposed standard has been published by a credible medical society probably does
indicate that to follow the proposed standard would be acceptable practice ....
However, published recommendations are not generally regarded as standards of care
until they are widely accepted by physicians.").
:46 Washington v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 182 (D.C. 1990).
47 SeeAnderson v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 391 (D.N.D. 1990), quoted in Berlin,
supra note 102, at 277; see also Ayres, supra note 26, at 429 (suggesting that guidelines
developed by physicians who practice at university medical centers may not be
appropriate for rural physicians).
Havighurst, supra note 7, at 101.
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[a] guideline becomes a standard of care when the device behind the
guideline is available and readily usable as a practical matter by members
of other medical specialties who have cause and reason to consider its
use.
... Before... mandation [of a standard of care] by law .... the
profession must recognize the matriculation of the idea to the guideline
to the standard. 
'-'
Such suggestions build from a typology established by David M.
Eddy, who is considered the father of the clinical practice guideline
movement. Eddy described three different types of CPGs:
"standards," "guidelines," and "options."' ° A "standard" is based on
solid empirical evidence about the effects and outcomes of the
medical intervention at issue and on virtual unanimity among patients
as to the overall desirability of the outcomes. If only some of the
important outcomes of an intervention are known, and what is known
about the outcomes is preferred by an appreciable but not unanimous
majority of patients, then a CPG concerning that intervention is
described as a "guideline." If there is significant uncertainty about
either the outcomes of the intervention or their desirability to
patients, the CPG should be regarded merely as an "option."
According to Eddy, standards are intended to apply very rigidly.
Deviations from a standard "will be rare and difficult to justif" and
"should trigger thoughts of malpractice."" Guidelines "should be
followed in most cases," but may be tailored to fit individual cases.
"Deviation from a guideline by itself does not imply malpractice." :2
Options are merely informational. They "leave practitioners free to
choose any course.""' Thus, under Eddy's typology, a standard should
be viewed as a minimum standard of care and as representing
prevailing medical custom. In contrast, guidelines and options may or
may not represent custom, and may or may not represent a true ideal.
They represent our best guesses, at different levels of certainty, about
what the ideal standard of care is. Not everyone agrees with these
W"' illiam H. Ginsburg, 1Wen Does a Guideline Become a Standard? The New
Amoican Socritv ofAnesthesiologists Guidelines Give Us a Clue, 22 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED.
1891, 1895 (1993).
I-- David M. Eddy, Designing a Practice Policy: Standards, Guidelines, and Options, 263
JAMA 3077, 3081 (1990).
''J Id. at 3077.
Id.
Id.
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guesses, so not all physicians follow the guidelines. Noncompliance
should not be penalized because we are not yet certain that we have
guessed correctly.
Even Eddy's assumption that "standards" represent custom can be
questioned, for it does not account for the fact that the diffusion of
new standards into medical practice takes time. First, the guidelines
must be disseminated to medical professionals through such vehicles
as publication in medical journals or mailings to hospitals. Following
dissemination, an interval of time is required for physicians to read
and evaluate the guidelines and to change their practice patterns in
order to fit them. Thus, the mere fact that a standard has been
published does not mean that it represents custom. "Over time, if the
guideline is widely adopted and followed by the medical community,
it will increasingly become a statement of the customary practice. In
the interim, however, the guideline may reflect just the opposite, a
statement of what the profession at large does not currently do."'
Overall, judicial and academic statements of what CPGs are meant
to represent are characterized by confusion and overgeneralization.
There exists little agreement as to whether CPGs represent a
minimum baseline, a not-yet-attained ideal, or a customary practice
that lies somewhere between these two extremes. Moreover, most
commentators tend to lump all guidelines together rather than
acknowledge the varying levels of empirical certainty that undergird
them. Finally, even those-such as Eddy-who do recognize finer
distinctions among CPGs tell us little about the amount of time and
effort that must be expended before new CPGs can be considered
firmly entrenched in custom.
This confusion in the literature may be explained in part by the
near-absence of any reference to empirical studies of compliance with
CPGs. Legal commentators consistently speculate about whether or
not CPGs represent custom without examining the actual evidence on
this point. What does this evidence show?
2. The Compliance Gap
Estimates of the percentage of physicians who comply with well-
established CPGs in their specialties vary from study to study' and
154 Rosoff, supra note 25, at 380.
-55 It is somewhat difficult to compare the results of compliance studies because
different measures of compliance are used in each of them. Some studies examine
medical outcomes-for example, the rates of adverse medical events or other key
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from guideline to guideline. The results of several of the major
compliance studies may be summarized as follows:
" The average compliance rate with eleven different CPGs
created by the National Institutes of Health wasjust 57%, even
after an informational conference was held in an effort to
boost compliance."'3
* Only 6% of physicians who were aware of hypertension
guidelines referred to them "very often," whereas nearly 40%
said they, used the guidelines "very little" or "not at all." About
two-thirds of physicians' hypertension treatment practices
conformed to the guidelines, both before and after the
guidelines were released.
15 7
* Only 13% of patients at a university internal medicine practice
received the annual mammogram prescribed by well-known
CPGs.) -1
* Compliance with various of the National Cancer Institute's
guidelines on staging and radiation therapy for certain types
of cancer ranged from 27% to 67%.'59
" Contrmry to diabetes guideline recommendations, 84% of
Medicare patients with diabetes did not receive recommended
tests, 54% had not seen an ophthalmologist, and 45% had not
undergone cholesterol screening. '6
" Sixty-four percent of physicians complied with a CPG on chest
pain, a result that prompted the study authors to conclude
that "this was a successfully implemented guideline." 6
markers of poor-quality care-while others survey or observe physicians directly to see
if their practice patterns conform to prescribed procedures. I have focused on the
latter group of studies because their measure of compliance is more direct and
reliable.I, Jacqueline Kosecoff et al., Effects of the National Institutes of Health Consensus
D"Z, lonm, nt Program on Phyician Practice, 258JAMA 2708 (1987).
Martha N. Hill et al., Awareness, Use, and Impact of the 1984 Joint National
('nmittte Cons nsus Report on High Blood Pressure, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1190, 1191
(1988), cited in Woolf, supra note 26, at 2648.
I,, Stephen J. McPhee et al., Performance of Cancer Screening in a University General
Introwal Medicine Practice, 1J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 275, 277 (1986).
1,, Leslie G. Ford et al., Effects of Patient Management Guidelines on Physician Practice
Patt ra : The Community Hospital Oncology Program Experience 5 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOG
5( 4, 507 (1987), cited in Woolf, supra note 26, at 2648.
1'. Jonathan P. Weiner et al., Variation in Office-Based Quality: A Claims-Based Profile
of Ca' Providf to Medicare Patients with Diabetes, 273 JAMA 1503, 1505 (1995), cited in
Roiger J. Zoorob & Michael D. Hagen, Guidelines on the Care of Diabetic Nephropathy,
Ptonpthy and Foot Disease, 56 AMN1. FAfM. PHYsIcLn.N 2021, 2026 (1997).
A. Gray Ellrodt et al., Measuring and Improving Physician Compliance with Clinical
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* Fewer than 50% of patients recovering from heart attacks
received the beta-blocker drugs recommended by the
American College of Cardiology guidelines."'2
* About 60% of physicians were aware of national guidelines on
preventive care and high blood pressure one year after the
guidelines were released.'
6 3
* Physicians disagreed with about 12% of published guidelines
on preventive services.'6
* Only 3% of Canadian physicians tested could correctly
identify the appropriate actions recommended by guidelines
on caesarean sections in eight scenarios. The average score
for individual scenarios was only 67% correct.' 65
These results can be synthesized into two primary findings. First,
overall compliance with CPGs is fairly low. A meta-analysis of 23
compliance studies published in the 1980-1991 period determined
that the average compliance rate across 143 sets of guidelines was only
54.5%.166 Compliance may be suboptimal for a variety of reasons:
Physicians may not be aware of the guidelines, they may disagree with
them on their face, they may feel the guidelines do not apply to a
Practice Guidelines: A Controlled Interventional Tria4 122 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 277, 280
(1995).
162 Donald A. Brand et al., Cardiologists' Practices Compared with Practice Guidelines:
Use of Beta-Blockade After Acute Myocardial Infarction, 26J. AMN1. C CARDIOLOGY 1432, 1434
(1995). The "target" compliance rate in this study was 75%, see id. at 1435, suggesting
that the authors did not believe the guidelines represented prevailing medical custom.
163 Hill et al., supra note 157, at 1190 (indicating that the guidelines codified,
rather than changed, practice behavior among the physicians in the sample); see also
KC. Stange et al., Physician Agreement with U.S. Preventive Services Task Force
Recommendations, 34 J. FAM. PRAc. 409, 414 (1992) (reporting further that 39% of
surveyed practicing physicians had never heard of the guidelines set forth by the
United States Preventive Services Task force).
1, Stange et al., supra note 163, at 413 (noting that physician disagreement urith
recommendations was associated with older age, not having completed a residency,
male sex, less prior exposure to the guidelines, and greater perception of their
impracticability).
165 Jonathan Lomas et al., Do Practice Guidelines Guide Practice? The Effect of a
Consensus Statement on the Practice of Physicians, 321 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1306, 1308 (1989).
16 Roberto Grilli & Jonathan Lomas, Evaluating the Message: The Relationship
Between Compliance Rate and the Subject of a Practice Guideline, 32 MED. CARE 202, 202
(1994). Compliance was highest in the areas of cardiology and oncology (around 63%
and 62%, respectively). See id. at 208 (comparing this with preventive care, dental care,
and gynecology). The more complex the procedure the lower the compliance. See id.
at 203 (defining high complexity as occurring when a practitioner with average skills
working in an average setting perceives a procedure to be difficult or as requiring
specific resources for its implementation).
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particular case, or they may be unable to adhere to the prescribed
procedures because of resource constraints.
The second finding is that compliance is substantially lower when
the CPG is disseminated unaccompanied by any targeted efforts by
hospitals, health insurers, or liability insurers to induce compliance.
Interventions such as educational seminars,'7 feedback, and audits'6'
may boost compliance substantially. Even more effective may be
financial incentives, such as liability insurers' offers to reduce
malpractice insurance premiums if physicians agree to follow CPGs.'39
Most guidelines, however, are not implemented using these means.
The), are published in leading journals, and hospitals and physicians
are expected to conform their practice to the new state of the art. It is
therefore unsurprising that compliance rates for most guidelines are
not higher.
Based on this review of the empirical literature, it might be said
that a preponderance, or slim majority, of physicians comply with well-
publicized clinical practice guidelines. For most guidelines, however,
compliance is no higher than this. Is this sufficient to conclude that
the guidelines represent medical custom? "Custom" is a slippery
concept, but it arguably represents something more entrenched and
more prevalent than just a majority approach. Black's Law Dictionary
defines "custom and usage" as "[g] eneral rules and practices that have
become generally adopted through unvarying habit and common
use.""17,1 This definition suggests a level of adherence to the practice
far exceeding fifty percent.
If CPGs do not, in fact, represent custom, are they a proper basis
for the standard of care in malpractice cases? That is, should tort law
1", So, Bernard S. Linn, Continuing Medical Education: Impact on Emergency Room
Burn Care, 2,44 JAMA 565, 569 (1980) (revealing that patients who received an
educational intervention complied more frequently ith medical regimens and had
fewer early complications in their bums).
" See Woolf, supra note 26, at 2647 (considering guidelines as a form of
continuing medical education). But see Harold I. Goldberg et al., A Randomized
(,itollRd Trial of CQI Teams and Academic Detailing: Can They Alter Compliance with
Guzd,liws, 24 JOINT COMMISSION J. ON QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 130, 135 (1998)
(finding that education and feedback sessions with physicians did not improve
compliance uith national guidelines for the treatment of hypertension and
depression).
1"' Se Walker et al., supra note 12, at 41 (noting that in Massachusetts, insurers
that offered a twenty percent premium reduction for anesthesiologists who complied
uith CPGs saw the number of lawsuits related to hypoxia during anesthesia drop from
six per )ear to zero, over a three-year period).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (7th ed. 1999).
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rely on professional custom in these cases or should it strive to hold
physicians to some higher ideal of good medical practice?
B. The Consequences of Preferring CPGs to Custom
This sub-Part first responds to common arguments against
reliance on custom in medical malpractice litigation. It then argues
that the use of custom serves an important signaling role in tort law:
It reduces the uncertainty facing actors about what level of precaution
is legally required of them. This, in turn, increases the deterrent
value of the tort law. Finally, this sub-Part argues that judicial
deviation from custom in malpractice cases represents an imprudent
use of the tort law to engineer the practice of medicine. The
implication of these arguments is that to the extent that CPGs are not
representative of medical custom, their role in setting the standard of
care in malpractice cases should be minimal.
1. The Case Against Custom
Two arguments are commonly advanced in favor of abandoning
or reducing our reliance on medical custom to establish the standard
of care. The first, and perhaps more compelling, argument is that
there exists such heterogeneity of opinion among physicians as to
proper care that it cannot be said that a single custom truly exists.
The highly differentiated nature of medical problems and the
differing rates at which physicians are willing to accept new
technologies and treatment modalities into their practice are cited as
sources of this heterogeneity.' The wide variation observable in
practice patterns across the country is said to constitute evidence of
the lack of consensus.1 An unfortunate implication of this diversity
of practice and opinion is that it necessitates the use of medical
experts in litigation to cull a single standard from the cacophony of
opinion. This gives rise to a battle of the experts in which hired guns
clash with opposing opinions, neither of which is any more
171 See Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 44, at 1390-91 (discussing the
impediments to the formation of a stable concept of custom).
172 Practice pattern variations, however, are not necessarily indicative of differing
opinions as to what constitutes good-quality care. Such variations may instead be the
product of resource constraints-that is, physicians may agree on what ought to be
done, but physicians in poor and rural areas may not have the wherewithal to adhere
to the agreed-upon standard. The "similar communities" rule for the standard of care
in malpractice law represents an acknowledgment of this reality. Hall v. Hilbun, 466
So. 2d 856, 872 (Miss. 1985).
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empirically supportable than the other.
73
There are two responses to this argument. The first, which is
discussed in greater depth later in this Article, is that departure from
custom in favor of greater reliance on CPGs will ameliorate neither
the heterogeneity problem nor the "battle of the experts" problem.
It is true that there exists a diversity of opinion among physicians as to
the proper standard of care, but it is equally true that there exists a
diversity of opinion among guideline promulgators. The fact there are
currently 1600 different CPGs in existence attests to this fact.
Litigants would probably need to use expert witnesses to select among
these guidelines and to convince the trier of fact that their chosen
guideline represents the true standard of care; thus, the "battle of the
experts" would not be eliminated, but rather supplemented ith an
additional "battle of the guidelines. Additionally, existing medical
malpractice law already takes into account the fact that there exist
diverse schools of opinion regarding proper care. The law provides
that if a physician's conduct deviates from the majority approach to
treatment in a particular clinical situation but conforms to a
"respectable minority" approach, it will not be deemed negligent 7
Rather than inferring from a diversity of opinion that no custom
exists, this approach concludes that, in some circumstances, more
than one custom may exist. This is an eminently reasonable way to
deal with the heterogeneity problem.
The second argument commonly advanced against reliance on
custom is that much medical custom is wasteful and should not be
encouraged by the courts. Clark Havighurst has argued:
With respect to medical care, however, custom is a poor guide to what is
economicallyjustified. Customary medical practices have evolved in the
United States under systems of paying for medical care that create
economic incentives for both physicians and patients to overutilize
services, spending more on marginal benefits than they are in any sense
worth. For the tort system to enforce adherence to practice norms
arising spontaneously under an incentive system fraught with moral
hazard is to convert an inefficiency that may be acceptable as a necessary
17. Ste Havighurst, supra note 7, at 96 (noting that experts are "not impartial ...
they are selected by the parties ith a view to the positions they will take and their skill
in persuadingjuries").
"' Rosoff, supra note 25, at 386.
Se id at 388 (suggesting that courts should use an acceptable, rather than the
best, guideline); see generally EPSTEIN, supra note 57, at 142 (discussing the difficulties
in deciding "which [medical] custom prevails when there is an honest division of
opinion over the proper course of treatment").
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cost of financial protection into a mandatory burden on society.176
One might quarrel with Havighurst's characterization of medical
custom. While it was undoubtedly true in the past that physicians had
significant financial incentives to oversupply care, because of the
nature of the historically predominant fee-for-service reimbursement
system, this may no longer be true in the age of managed care. 77 To
the extent that defensive medicine is still practiced, however,
Havighurst's characterization may have some continuing relevance.
He may be correct in thinking that using medical custom will
encourage overprovision of care, a socially inefficient outcome. Using
CPGs, however, would also result in inefficiency and overprovision, for
a different reason. The problem with CPGs is not that the standard of
care they embody is itself inefficient, although it may be. The
problem is, rather, that a shift from reliance on custom to reliance on
CPGs will increase the amount of uncertainty physicians have about
the legal standard of care, and this uncertainty itself creates
inefficiency.
2. CPGs, Custom, and Uncertainty
At first blush, it might seem that a switch to a CPG-based standard
of care would reduce the amount of uncertainty physicians currently
face as to what is required of them. This argument rests on two
assumptions, however: (1) that CPGs are clear and specific enough to
let a physician know exactly what to do in a given clinical encounter;
and (2) that there is a single dominant CPG to which the physician
knows he must adhere. Neither of these assumptions are certain at
this point in time.
A large proportion of the current guidelines are extremely vague.
76 Havighurst, supra note 7, at 97-98 (footnotes omitted).
177 "Moral hazard" results from the fee-for-service system because physicians
receive additional income for every marginal service they render. Historically, efforts
by insurers to audit physician charges to ensure that the services rendered were
"medically necessary" have been minimal. The advent of managed care, however, has
both decimated the number of physicians who operated on a fee-for-service basis and
dramatically increased the use of utilization review, or audits for medical necessity.
Physicians operating under managed care contracts render care on a capitated basis:
They receive a flat monthly or annual paysnent from the insurer in exchange for
providing a comprehensive range of services. The amount of income they receive per
patient does not vary with the amount of services actually rendered, so the moral
hazard problem is eliminated (and may actually be inverted, since capitation provides
incentives to undersupply care).
17, Kapp, supra note 27, at 498; Rinella, supra note 15, at 352.
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Indeed, vague guidelines are necessary for more complex medical
situations in order to allow physicians sufficient latitude to exercise
clinical judgment. The AHRQ guidelines on depression are a classic
example. The guidelines state, "It]he specific medication choice is
based on side-effect profiles, history of prior response, family history
of response, type of depression, concurrent general medical or
psychiatric illnesses, and concurrently prescribed medications."",
Consider as a second example the National Institutes of Health's
guideline on coronary-artery bypass surgery: "A reasonable diagnostic
workup of a patient with angina pectoris [prior to considering bypass
surgery] ... should be done as efficiently as possible to provide
definitive information on which clinical decisions can be based.
Unnecessary and redundant procedures should be avoided."'8" What
would be more informative to a physician trying to determine what
standard of care is legally required of her: these CPGs or her
kaowledge of the customary practice among her colleagues and those
who trained her? Certainly most physicians would choose the latter.
CPGs may also be vague in a second way: They may not state
clearly whether they are, in Eddy's terminology, "standards,"
"guidelines," or "options."" The myriad CPG promulgators in the
United States have, as yet, failed to adopt a common vocabulary to
indicate the strength of the empirical foundations of a given CPG and
the extent to which it is legally binding. "' Consequently, CPGs do not
clearly signal physicians whether compliance is mandatory or merely
suggested-that is, whether the CPG represents a firmly entrenched
medical standard of care or merely an educated guess at what
constitutes good quality care.
In addition to the vagueness problem, there is also the problem of
17 Deprssion in Primay Care, TREATMENT OF MAJOR DEPRESSION: CLINICAL
PRACTICE GUIDELINE No. 5 (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockvile,
Md.), Apr. 1993; see also Kadzielski et al., supra note 31, at 163 ("Such a guideline is
really of little or no help at all.... A guideline such as this would be difficult to
introduce as justification in a court of law for one physician's decision to prescribe an
antidepressant medication.").
1National Institutes of Health, Consensus-Development Conference Statement:
Cfvr,)nai-Arte), Bypass Surgery: Scientific and Clinical Aspects, 304 NEw ENG. J. MEID. 680,
681 (1981), quoted in Mark R. Chassin, Standards of Care in Medicine, 25 INQUIRY 437,
439 (1988).
Supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
Swe Hirshfeld, supra note 20, at 2887 ("Without these common understandings,
a court confronted with a practice parameter would have to inquire into the process
used for its development, the meaning of its format, and the meaning of its
terminology in order to understand the limits of its use.").
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multiplicity. There are 1600 sets of guidelines in existence. " ' For any
given medical condition or intervention, there may be a dozen or
more competing guidelines. For example, the American Cancer
Society's guidelines for breast cancer detection recommend "a
mammogram every year" after age 50, while the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists' guidelines just recommend "regular"
mammograms. How is a physician to know which guideline to
follow? As Arnold Rosoff has commented, "a pluralistic system
allowing alternative, conflicting guidelines is inherently untidy and
undoubtedly would complicate matters by inviting controversy over
which guideline should be regarded as authoritative, or more
authoritative."'8 5
Given these problems of vagueness and multiplicity, it is not
unreasonable to argue that the level of uncertainty physicians have
about the legal standard of care might actually be increased, rather
than decreased, by a shift from custom to CPGs as the basis for that
standard. What are the implications of increased uncertainty for the
efficiency of the tort law?
It is an established principle in the law-and-economics literature
that where there exists uncertainty surrounding the standard of care,
a negligence regime will overdeter risky conduct, resulting in
inefficiency. As rational economic actors, potential defendants
conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine what level of precaution
to take in the conduct of their affairs. Where this analysis is
performed under conditions of uncertainty,
defendants do not face a simple choice between actions certain to lead
to liability and actions bearing no risk of liability at all. Instead, each
possible action is accompanied by an associated probability that a
defendant will be tried, found liable, and made to pay damages or a
fine ....
... To the extent that defendants are influenced by the fear of
liability, their behavior will be influenced by this distribution of
probabilities, rather than simply by the nominal legal standard. 1
8
183 SeeAyres, supra note 26, at 421.
184 Levine v. Rosen, 616 A.2d 623, 628 (Pa. 1992).
185 Rosoff, supra note 25, at 386. For an example of the way in which the multiple
guidelines for mammograms have created confusion over the legal standard of care,
see Kramerv. Milner, 639 N.E.2d 157 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
186 John E. Calfee & Richard Crasvell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with
Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 969-70 (1984). For some standard criticisms of
economic analysis of tort law, see Shuman, supra note 8, at 137-39.
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Empirical research has confirmed that physicians do alter their
behavior in response to the perceived threat of malpractice
litigation. ' They will take precautions (such as ordering additional
diagnostic tests and other services) to the extent that they believe it
will appreciably reduce their risk of being sued.
It is not desirable, however, to have physicians take every
conceivable precaution to prevent adverse medical outcomes.
Standard economic analysis assumes that while the cost of each
marginal precaution is constant, the benefits of marginal precautions
decline.' The result is that at some point, the marginal costs of
additional precautions outweigh their benefits. Taking precautions
beyond this point constitutes inefficient overdeterrence of risky
behavior. Thus, the goal of the tort law is to encourage risk-taking
and precaution-taking at the equilibrium level where marginal cost
equals marginal benefit."9
Deterrence theory assumes that actors are cognizant of the
likelihood of tort sanctions for negligent behavior and choose to take
necessary precautions to avoid those sanctions."" Research in the
criminal law context has revealed that three factors influence the
likelihood that an actor will engage in proscribed conduct: the
swiftness, certainty, and severity of punishment."' Of these, certainty
is believed to be by far the most important motivation.5 2 Applied to
malpractice liability,'3  this research suggests that physicians'
precaution-taking behavior will be influenced by physicians' perceived
likelihood of having an unfavorable judgment levied against them.
This likelihood can be viewed as the product of several correlated'
17 WEILERET AL., supra note 107, at 132.
I" For an excellent presentation of this efficiency analysis, see EPSTEN, supra note
57, at 91-93.
J This idea ias famously expressed by Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Canoll Towig Co., as follows: "[Ihf the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the
burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P; i.e.,
whether B < PL." 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).)", Shuman, supra note 8, at 116.
-I Id. at 121.
V.t id. (stating that empirical research is conclusive regarding the relationship
between certainty and deterrence).
I-, Daniel Shuman notes that there are reasons to question the applicability of the
criminal law research to the civil context, but adopts this extension nonetheless. Id. at
121 & n.32.
01 The probabilities are correlated because the more egregious the physician's
deviation from the standard of care, the more likely an injury is to result, and the more
grievous the injury, the more likely the patient is to file and win a lawsuit.
20011
690 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREV1EW [Vol. 149:645
probabilities: the probability that the physician's conduct will fall
below the legal standard of care, the probability that an injury will
result, the probability that the patient will file a malpractice suit, and
the probability that the suit will be resolved in the plaintiff's favor.''
Uncertainty as to any of these probabilities will lead the actor to
err on the side of taking excessive precautions. This is because the
costs of undercompliance and overcompliance with the standard of
care are asymmetrical. 6 Undercompliance exposes the actor to the
risk of expensive litigation, while overcompliance subjects him only to
the additional cost of the extra precautions taken." The
attractiveness of reduced exposure to liability will be highest where
the amount the actor would expect to pay, if found liable, is high.
Thus, the incentive to overcomply will be greatest within activities in
which the equilibrium level of care still involves a significant risk of
costly accidents. 9 8 Medicine would certainly seem to fall into this
category, as adverse outcomes frequently result even from good-
quality care. According to this analysis, if a physician is uncertain
about the legal standard of care for a particular clinical situation-
that is, if he is uninformed as to where the law has fixed the
equilibrium point for precaution-taking-he will oversupply
precautionary medical services such as diagnostic tests. This
overdeterrence is manifested in the practice of defensive medicine.
Since the substitution of CPGs for custom as the legal standard of
care would increase the level of uncertainty physicians have about the
standard of care, we would expect to see an attendant increase in
defensive medicine rather than a decrease. A CPG-based standard of
care would make the tort law less efficient.
195 [The tort law] cannot enable [a man] to predict with certainty whether a
given act under given circumstances will make him liable, because an act will
rarely have that effect unless followed by damage, and for the most part, if not
always, the consequences of an act are not known, but only guessed at as more
or less probable.
O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 79 (Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1881).
196 See EPSTEIN, supra note 57, at 98 (describing how an actor would choose to
spend one hundred dollars in extra precautions to insure against a one thousand
dollar risk in the presence of an uncertain standard); Calfee & Craswell, supra note
186, at 966-67.
17 Under fee-for-service medicine, the insurer, rather than the physician, pays
these additional costs. This incentivizes doctors to overcomply, unlike other economic
actors who must bear the costs of additional precautions themselves.
19 Calfee & Craswell, supra note 186, at 981.
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3. Tort Law As an Engineering Tool
The foregoing discussion suggests that one function of the tort
system-perhaps even the dominant function "'--is to bring about the
efficient level of safety. But a shift from custom to CPGs as the basis of
the standard of care does not further the efficiency function. In
addition, such a shift would ill-sene other functions of the tort law.
Tort law in the medical malpractice realm serves a compensation
function for patients injured by physician conduct that falls below
customary medical practice. Grounding the legal standard of care in
CPGs is not tailored to furthering this goal because in most cases it
sets the threshold of liability above custom.""' In such a regime, tort
law overcompensates injured parties and serves as a tool of social
engineering by pulling up the medical standard of care towards some
ideal. Co-opting the tort law in this fashion is imprudent and unfair.
As discussed in sub-Part I.B, for most industries, the courts have
shown little reluctance to engage in judicial inflation of the customary
standard of care. They have uncoupled the negligence standard from
the blameworthiness standard. Blameworthiness, Oliver Wendell
Holmes wrote, is "determined by the existing average standards of the
community"-that is, by custom.20 ' But in the name of incentivizing
people to make progress in the direction of safety, Holmes felt it
legitimate to hold some defendants liable notwithstanding the fact
that they were not "blameworthy.",' 2  This uncoupling of the
negligence standard from custom has not, however, taken hold in the
context of medical malpractice. The courts have shown far greater
reluctance to impose their vision of safe and socially optimal practice
upon medical professionals, and for good reason. As Richard Epstein
has eloquently explained:
Physicians and other health care providers operate under multiple
constraints: the glare of publicity when things go wrong; the censure of
their colleagues; peer review; revocation of hospital privileges; a referral
network; licensing; and the pressure to do a good job when a life is on
the line. Perfection is the social aspiration, but not a legal requirement;
an honest effort in conformity with customary standards is all that can be
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1J. LEG. STUD. 29, 33 (1972).
As was discussed earlier, some CPGs-those devised by health care payers--may
prescribe care that is less than what doctors would ordinarily do. More commonly,
howexer, CPGs represent optimal care, and customary practice falls short of their
prescriptions.
HOLMES, supra note 195, at 125.
Id. at 125-26.
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demanded of physicians. Innovation and medical advance are surely
desired, but these are fostered by wise institutional practices, and
imaginative medical research. Even if medical standards "lagged"
behind our deepest aspirations, the law could not bring it up to speed by
altering the rules governing medical malpractice actions.
This passage suggests that there is a fundamental distinction
between what the tort law is trying to achieve and what health care
reformers are trying to achieve. While medical malpractice law has
traditionally aimed to deter conduct that falls below the customary
standard of care and compensate persons injured as a result of such
conduct,204 reformers who advocate the use of CPGs in litigation have
another motive: to raise the quality of care above existing customary
practice. It is clear from the academic commentary on tort reform
that proponents of CPGs view their use in litigation as a lever to
compel physicians to comply with guidelines.Y
Wielding the tort law as a club in this fashion raises fairness
concerns vis-A-vis physician-defendants. When courts begin to leave
custom behind and craft new standards of care, a serious notice
problem is created. Physicians have come to expect, based on decades
of malpractice jurisprudence, that their actions will be judged against
the standards of prevailing medical practice. To hold that a medical
custom is facially unreasonable, such that compliance with it will not
excuse a physician from liability, violates these expectations. It is
unfair to penalize physicians for noncompliance with a standard of
which they have been given inadequate notice. This was the concern
of the Washington state legislature in overturning by statute the
decision in Helling v. Carey"
More fundamentally, wielding the tort law as an instrument of
social engineering is imprudent because it is an inefficient way of
bringing about improvements in the quality of medical care. There
are still some who dispute that greater compliance with CPGs will
203 EPsTEIN, supra note 57, at 140-41.
204 See generally Shuman, supra note 8, at 118-19 (discussing the deterrence and
compensation functions of tort law).
See Hyams et al., supra note 95, at 450 ("Reformers believe that guidelines [will]
reduce litigation by encouraging compliance with the standard of care.. . ."); Trail &
Allen, supra note 24, at 251 (noting that doctors will be more willing to comply with
the guidelines because doing so will give them an affirmative defense in malpractice
litigation).
206 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) (holding that reasonable prudence required that
the doctor administer a routine pressure test of glaucoma to the patient even though
professional standards did not require the doctor to do so).
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improve the quality of care, but even if that premise is accepted, it
does not necessarily follow that the tort law is the means that should
be employed to induce greater compliance. Changing behavior on a
mass scale through litigation involves heavy administrative costs.
Among the sources of expense are: the direct costs of litigation,
including attorneys' fees and the costs of discovery and juries; the long
period of time that it may take to achieve a change in the legal regime
through litigation; and the possibility of having to litigate the same
issues on a repeated basis against different noncomplying
defendants.' "
Where possible, it is economically preferable to avoid these
litigation costs by attempting to change behavior through private
channels. Possible means of doing so include contract, the
enforcement of social norms through self-help," s and educative
persuasion. Of these, the last holds the greatest promise for
increasing compliance with CPGs. There has already evolved a
substantial commitment, on the part of institutional health care
providers and academic researchers, to piloting various educational,
training, and monitoring programs to encourage physicians to learn
about and follow CPGs.""  While not uniformly successful, such
initiatives are far less expensive than enforcing compliance through
litigation. There is no empirical evidence directly comparing the
effectiveness of litigation and education in inducing compliance, but
it is reasonable to posit that education may be more effective in the
long run because education may actually persuade physicians that
following the guidelines represents good quality care, rather than
merely showing them that compliance is a necessary evil in order to
avoid being sued. If physicians genuinely believe in the legitimacy of
the guidelines, they will be more likely to make them a consistent part
of their practice.
A final consideration counseling against ajudicial departure from
reliance on custom to establish the standard of care is institutional
competence. Arejudges and juries competent to determine what the
appropriate standard of care is in medical encounters? Richard
"- See GUIDO CALABREsI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 286-87 (1970) (noting the
costiness of the tort s)stem's reliance on juries and individual case-by-case
determinations).
_" St,, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of
Social Contol, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 68 (1987) (describing the main method of private
dispute resolution among ranchers in Shasta County, California).
See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text (discussing interventions which
may boost compliance with CPGs).
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Posner has argued that courts are only able to determine optimal
levels of precaution-taking in "simple cases."2 0 The factual complexity
of most medical conditions and treatments takes malpractice cases out
of this category. Loosening the malpractice standard from its anchor
in custom would greater expose it to the varying winds of untrained
guesses about what constitutes appropriate care.
Advocates may respond that rather than providing judges and
juries unbridled discretion to select a standard of care, reform merely
contemplates allowing them to base their decisions on the CPG
standard, which represents the consensus of top experts in the
relevant medical specialty. Surely there is no institutional competence
problem with that. This argument would be persuasive if there
existed only a single set of CPGs for each medical condition and
intervention. In a "pluralistic" guideline enAronment, 2 " however,
courts must choose which set of guidelines to adopt in a particular
case. It is not at all clear that judges have the expertise to be able to
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of competing guidelines. While
courts could employ their own independent medical experts to assist
in this determination, arguably it is preferable to allow the market to
select a governing standard of medical practice-that is, to rely on
custom.
I have argued that since CPGs do not represent current medical
custom, and it would be ill-advised to depart from custom as the
standard of care in malpractice cases, CPGs should not be afforded
substantial weight as inculpatory evidence. Many of those who agree
that it is premature, at best, to allow plaintiffs to wield CPGs as a sword
in malpractice litigation have suggested that this does not mean that
we should preclude physician-defendants from using them as a shield.
Arguably, Maine-model reforms address many of the problems raised
above. The multiplicity problem, for example, is dealt with by
granting physicians an affirmative defense whenever they have
complied with any authoritative guideline. As the next Part discusses,
however, the one-way exculpatory use of CPGs raises problems of its
own.
210 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 161 (3d ed. 1986).
21 Havighurst, supra note 7, at 113.
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III. THE EXCULPATORY USE OF CPGs: ASYMMETRY AND ANOMALY
A. One-Way Streets in the Law
Permitting the introduction of certain evidence by one party to a
212lawsuit but not by the other party is an anomaly in the law. The
most fundamental rule of the Federal Rules of Evidence is that all
evidence that is relevant is admissible unless specifically excluded . 3
There are many types of evidence that are excluded under the Rules,
but typically these exclusions apply equally to both parties. This
reflects a general preference in American law for symmetry, or
evenhandedness, in the application of legal rules. As Barbara Flagg
and Katherine Goldwasser have observed, "Law would not be law as we
know it without the requirement of evenhandedness; justice as we
envision her is blindfolded, so as not to see who stands before her.
2 14
There are exceptions to the rule of symmetry, but they are few and far
between, and each is justified by an important policy concern.
Arguably, no such policy justification exists for the one-way use of
clinical practice guidelines evidence in medical malpractice cases.
1. Character Evidence
Perhaps the best-known exception to the rule that if evidence is
admissible, it is admissible by either party to a dispute, is character
evidence in criminal cases. Rule 404(a) (1) states that "[e]vidence of a
person's character or a trait of character is not admissible [by the
prosecution] for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion," but may be offered by the accused
to prove his own good character.2 ' 5 The prosecution may only offer
character evidence in rebuttal if the defendant has chosen to
introduce character evidence. This one-way street is justified by the
basic tenet of criminal law that a defendant should be tried only on
the instant charge, not for prior bad acts. We have good reason to
1" Sce Begel, supra note 132, at 97 ("No other area of law comes to mind in which
plaintiffs would be prohibited from using relevant evidence regarding standards,
guidelines, or usual and customary practices in similar circumstances."); Adam
Kargman, Note, Three Maelstroms and One Tweak: Federal Rules of Evidence 413 to 415 and
Their Arizona Counterpart, 41 ARIz. L. RE-V. 963, 964 (1999) (discussing the Federal
Rules of Evidence in sexual assault cases).
FED. R. EviD. 402.
21 Barbara Flagg & Katherine Goldwasser, Fighting for Truth, Justice, and the
AvYnmtrical Way, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 105, 105 (1998).,I. FED. R. EVID. 404 (a) (1).
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fear that ifjurors hear evidence of the accused's rotten character and
prior transgressions, they will become inflamed and cast a verdict
based on character, rather than on the evidence before them relating
to the present charge.2'6 Thus, character evidence is viewed as almost
always more prejudicial than probative when offered, which under
Rule 403217 merits its exclusion. In contrast, character evidence
offered to impeach a prosecution witness may sometimes be more
probative than prejudicial. It makes sense to allow an asymmetry in
the Rules of Evidence to correct this asymmetry inherent in the
circumstances. 2's Richard Friedman explains:
The accused is simply in a different situation from any other potential
witness-for either the prosecution or the defense-in a criminal
case.... The accused's conduct is necessarily the central issue in the
case, and even without character impeachment evidence, the
prosecution will do its best to put him in a bad light by trying to show
that he committed the crime charged. If the prosecution witness is a
mere observer, however, the defense may not have any comparable
mudslinging opportunity-unless character impeachment evidence is
allowed. 
9
While there is a great danger that the jury will convict the
defendant based on character evidence, there is no significant danger
that the jury will use character impeachment evidence offered by the
defense against a prosecution witness for an improper purpose-that
is, to draw conclusions about the witness's propensities unrelated to
her testimony. "Because the witness is only an observer, her non-
testimonial propensities are not material and are unlikely to affect the
jury's result."2" Therefore, it does not substantially burden the
prosecution orjeopardize the fairness or accuracy of the trial to admit
character evidence against prosecution witnesses but prohibit the
216 See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) (noting that prior
bad acts are excluded, not because they are irrelevant, but because there is a risk that
they will "overpersuade" a jury); Kargman, supra note 212, at 963 (discussing the
tradition of disfavoring character evidence on behalf of the defendant).
217 Rule 403 provides that "[allthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
213 See Richard D. Friedman, Comment, Character Impeachment Evidence: The
Asymmetrical Interaction Between Personality and Situation, 43 DUKE L.J. 816, 830 (1994)
(averring that this asymmetry simply responds to different situations with different
results, each promoting the truth-determination process).
219 Id. at 830-31.
220 Id. at 827 n.35.
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prosecutor from introducing such evidence against the defendant.
This asymmetry in the Rules of Evidence has a solid justification and
little prejudicial impact.
2. Evidence of Past Sexual Conduct
A second instance of asymmetry in the Federal Rules is the
treatment of evidence of past sexual conduct in rape cases. In 1994,
as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act,
Congress adopted Rules 413, 414, and 415, which allow evidence of
prior sexual assaults and child molestations by a defendant to be
admitted and "considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is
relevant."' The treatment of the defendant in these Rules stands in
stark contrast to the treatment of victims of sexual misconduct in Rule
412. That Rule provides that evidence of a victim's past sexual
behavior or "sexual predisposition" is inadmissible in any civil or
criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct except for
certain narrow purposes.22 As one commentator has put it, Rules 412
through 415 collectively provide that "plaintiffs and prosecutors can
'dirty up' defendants, but defendants cannot do the same to
plaintiffs.""""
An extremely important social policy underlies Rule 412:
protecting victims of sex crimes from harassment, embarrassment,
sexual stereotyping, and invasions of privacy. In the absence of such
protection, rape victims would be put through devastating cross-
examination at trial, and such an ordeal not only amounts to
secondary victimization but also deters victims from reporting and
testifying against sex offenders.' It is also argued that Rules 413
through 415 are justified by the high rate of recidivism among sex
offenders, which makes evidence concerning their past sexual
conduct particularly relevant to the adjudication of a sex offense
charge against them.22 ' Finally, like the asymmetry concerning other
' FED. R. EIvD. 413(a), 414(a). Rules 413 and 414 are addressed to criminal
-xses. Rule 415 applies the same rule to civil cases. Id. Rule 415(a).
Id. Rule 412(a). The exceptions are set forth in subsection (b), and include
such purposes as proving that a person other than the accused was the source of
semen or other physical evidence. Id. Rule 412(b).
Kargrnan, supra note 212, at 971.
" Swc UMwET & WOIUSON, supra note 82, at 254 (discussing the policy purpose
behind Rule 412).
But s.' Kargman, supra note 212, at 973-74 (disputing that rates of recidivism
among sex offenders, as measured by the number of rearrests, are higher than among
other criminals).
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kinds of character evidence, the asymmetry on sexual history evidence
is thought to be justified as a corrective measure for an inherent
asymmetry in the criminal trial itself. Rape trials are viewed as stacked
against the victim because of societal views toward women and
sexuality:
Rules 412 and 415 can be used to cleanse the fact finding process of
biases that have reinforced the asymmetry of power and powerlessness in
matters of sex. Both of these rules assist the trier of fact in focusing on
the behavior of the alleged perpetrator, rather than indulging in
stereotypic beliefs that women cannot be believed when making claims
of sexual misconduct. The result is a potentially powerful tool to combat
long-held stereotypes that have infected sexual misconduct cases: that
the victim either invited the treatment, or deserved it, or is not to be
believed without sufficient corroboration.226
While there seems little doubt that the Rules' asymmetry
regarding sexual history evidence imposes a substantial burden on the
defense in rape cases, policy considerations are believed to outweigh
this burden.
3. Other Asymmetrical Rules of Evidence
There are two other instances of asymmetry in the Federal Rules
that are worthy of mention. Rule 410 provides that a prosecutor may
not introduce evidence that the defendant offered to plead guilty or
227nolo contendere to the charges against her. The prosecutor also
may not introduce any statements made by the defendant in the
course of plea discussions that did not result in a plea of guilty or that
resulted in a guilty plea that the defendant later withdrew.2 The Rule
does not specifically provide that a defendant may introduce statements
made by the prosecutor in the course of plea discussions, but this is
implied from the fact that the Rule states only that plea evidence is
not "admissible against the defendant."229 The Rule thus embodies an
asymmetry.
This asymmetry is, however, both insignificant and well justified.
It is insignificant because there are few circumstances in which a
defendant who has withdrawn her guilty plea, or decided not to enter
such a plea, would wish to introduce any statements made by the
226 Jane Harris Aiken, Socual Character Evidence in Civil Actions: Refining the
Propensity Rule, 1997 WIs. L. REV. 1221, 1262-63 (citation omitted).
227 FED. R. EVID. 410(l)-(2).
228 Id. Rule 410(3).
229 Id. Rule 410.
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prosecutor during the aborted plea discussions. One might envision a
situation in which the defendant would want to introduce the
prosecutor's statements during plea discussions for the purpose of
later holding her to an oral promise made in the negotiations, but this
would only occur where the defendant has actually entered a guilty
plea and thus would not be covered by Rule 410. The asymmetry in
Rule 410 is also justified by the state's strong interest in encouraging
plea negotiations. In the absence of Rule 410, criminal defendants
would be extremely reluctant to enter into plea discussions and make
incriminating statements therein, for fear that their statements would
be used against them at a subsequent trial should the negotiations fail.
There are no such concerns that would motivate the two-way
exclusion of plea statements-that is, the exclusion of the
prosecutor's statements as well as the defendant's.
A final instance of asymmetry in the Federal Rules is Rule
801(d) (2), the party admissions exception to the hearsay rule. Rule
801 (d) (2) provides that an out-of-court statement is admissible if the
statement is made by a party and offered against her. "  Thus, a
plaintiff may use the defendant's own incriminating statement against
her at trial. This Rule constitutes an asymmetry in the law because the
defendant is not allowed to introduce her own statements against the
plaintiff. There are, however, two considerations justifying the
asymmetry. First, if one takes another view of the Rule, it is not
asymmetrical at all: both plaintiffs and defendants may offer
statements made by the other party against that party. The Rule does
not grant special evidentiary privileges to one party and not the other.
Secondly, there are valid reasons for admitting party admissions
against the declarant:
The most persuasive explanation is that the admissions doctrine
expresses the philosophy of the adversary system, in which each party is
responsible for making or breaking, inning or losing, his own lawsuit-
by his conduct both in and out of court. And a series of somewhat
related reasons points in the same direction: The hearsay doctrine is
designed to protect parties against uncross-examined statements, but a
part), can hardly complain that he has not had a chance to cross-examine
himself; admissions are a kind of conduct, amounting to behavior by a
party which provide circumstantial evidence of what they assert;
admissions give rise to estoppel notions and should be usable against a
part), for similar reasons; and a common sense of fairness suggests that
one should simply not be allowed to complain that his words are proved
- " Id. Rule 801 (d) (2).
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against him.23'
More fundamentally, where the party admission consists of an
incriminating statement, there is much less reason to be skeptical of
the truth of the statement than there is with most hearsay evidence.
People generally do not make false statements against their pecuniary
or penal interest.13 Thus, particularly where the statement is an
incriminating one, it makes sense to have a rule of evidence
permitting one party to introduce the other party's statement into
evidence against her, but prohibiting the declarant party from
introducing her own statement even if she feels it somehow works in
her favor to do so.
The foregoing examples illustrate that asymmetries in the Federal
Rules are few in number and uniformly backed by a strong policy or
epistemological justification. To adopt a Maine-model approach to
the admissibility of CPGs in medical malpractice suits would run
against the current of the law of evidence and would require a valid
justification of its own. Arguably, no such justification exists.
B. Possible Justifications for One-Way Admissibility
There are two arguments that Maine-model reformers might put
forward in favor of the one-way use of CPGs, but ultimately neither is
persuasive. The first argument is that the need to protect physicians
from the threat of a huge damages award justifies permitting
physicians to use compliance with CPGs as an affirmative defense in
malpractice cases while barring plaintiffs from using noncompliance
with CPGs to prove negligence. The costs of malpractice litigation-
to both physicians and society-are so large, the argument goes, that
we must provide physicians with a safe harbor against frivolous suits.
Moreover, according to law-and-economics theory, reducing the
uncertainty surrounding malpractice litigation by providing that the
physician will be "off the hook" if he can prove compliance with a
relevant CPG will produce a more optimal level of precaution-taking
by physicians and thereby strengthen the deterrent function of tort
231 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIrDENCE UNDER THE
RULES 212 (3d ed. 1996) (citations omitted).
232 See MAUET & WAoLFSON, supra note 82, at 199 ("The hearsay exception is based
on the assumption that people do not make statements damaging to themselves unless
they believe for good reason that their statements are true."). Rule 804 grants rights to
introduce this evidence to both parties and includes the statements of non-part)'
witnesses as well as party admissions against interest. FED. R. EVID. 804.
OF SWORDS AND SHIELDS
law.
There are several problems with this argument. First, it is
debatable whether there is a greater social need to insulate physicians
from tort liability than there is to protect other groups of defendants.
The costs of malpractice litigation, both direct and indirect, are
certainly high, but this can also be said of the costs of tort litigation in
a variety of other industries. Secondly, even if one does accept the
argument that physicians desene special protection from tort suits,
there are more direct ways of going about limiting their liability. For
examples of possible strategies, it is useful to look at the rules for
products liability set forth in the new Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability.2f" There, the American Law Institute caned out
special liability rules for blood products, prescription drugs, vaccines,
and medical devices because it felt that these products are so vitally
important to the nation's welfare that their manufacturers must be
encouraged to innovate and bring new products to market without
fear of being sued.2*' The Restatement modifies the traditional
negligence standard for product design defects for these medical
products, making it much more difficult for plaintiffs to win suits
against the manufacturers, in order to provide this extra measure of
protection. This is an approach to providing safe harbors that does
not xiolate the spirit of the Federal Rules by introducing an asymmetry
into the law of evidence.
A third problem is that if the guideline invoked by the physician
in her affirmative defense is a minimalist CPG created by a health care
235
payer, or merely an "option," to use Eddy's language, unsupported
by sound scientific evidence and a high degree of medical certainty,
then compliance with the guideline may not constitute non-
negligence as the law of medical malpractice has traditionally
conceived of it. Permitting an affirmative defense based on
compliance with such guidelines would not only weed out frivolous
lawsuits, it would weed out some meritorious suits as well. This is
undesirable from the standpoint of compensation. Thus, the
argument that physicians deserve special protection from malpractice
litigation does not adequately justify the imposition of a special
exidentiary disability on malpractice plaintiffs. There are fairer and
more precise ways to protect physicians.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY§§ 2,6, 19(c) (1998).
Sg , glally George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability ?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087 (2000).
Supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
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The second argument that Maine-model reformers might advance
in favor of the one-way use of CPGs is that this affirmative defense
would dramatically reduce the battle of the experts we presently see in
malpractice suits. " This argument should be taken seriously, as there
is no doubt that the existing level of reliance on expert opinion in
malpractice cases has produced undesirable results. Expert witnessing
has become a profession in and of itself, with "hired guns" available
for rent to the highest bidder.23 7 The sometimes-enormous fees paid
to medical experts create reason to doubt their objectivity. Even if
experts maintain the highest level of scientific integrity and offer
genuine and thoughtful opinions, there is some doubt as to whether
lay juries are able to evaluate competently the competing opinions of
more than one expert. They may not understand the complicated
information conveyed to them at trial.23 They also may not know how
to choose between two seemingly well-qualified experts who have
reached opposite conclusions. There is some evidence that jurors
may choose to believe one expert over the other on the basis of factors
irrelevant to the scientific merit of their opinion, such as the expert's
appearance, tone, and demeanor.239
Maine-model reformers are right to point out the shortcomings of
reliance on expert opinions. They are overly optimistic, however, in
their estimation of how far CPGs can go toward ameliorating the
battle of the experts. Experts will still be used, and required, for at
least three functions in a tort system that bases the standard of care on
CPGs. First, because litigants may invoke any one of a number of
competing sets of guidelines in a given case, expert opinion will be
needed to ascertain whether the proffered guidelines do in fact
represent the appropriate standard of care. This will require proof
that the organization that promulgated the guideline is composed of
qualified experts who are not motivated by the need to economize in
the provision of medical care, that the guidelines were developed
through a process characterized by scientific rigor and consensus
236 See Smith, supra note 140, at 358 (optimistically reporting in 1993 that the 1990
Maine project had "stopped the battle of the experts," even though no malpractice
suits had yet been brought invoking the project's CPG-based affirmative defense).
237 For a collection of news stories and reports discussing this phenomenon, see
Leah, supra note 7, at 1497 n.63.
R" See Trail & Allen, supra note 24, at 242 ('While jurors endeavor to remain
objective and evaluate the conflicting testimony provided by the expert witnesses, it is
unrealistic to expect laymen to comprehend intricate and detailed medical procedures
and related information.").
239 Leahy, supra note 7, at 1497 & n.64.
OF SIORDS AND SHIELDS
decisionmaking, that the guidelines are up-to-date, and that other sets
of guidelines are not superior to the set selected.2 ' Thus, in the
pluralistic environment of CPGs, the battle of the experts would not
be eliminated, but rather supplemented by a "battle of the
guidelines."""'
Second, experts will need to testify that the guidelines selected are
applicable to the particular clinical interaction at issue. The expert
must examine the clinical encounter itself and offer an opinion as to
whether the guidelines apply to that patient, exhibiting those
symptoms, requiring that particular intervention, in that particular
care setting. The more broadly stated and flexible the guidelines are,
the more extensive this factual inquiry by the expert will have to be.
For example, if the guidelines use language calling for a particular
procedure where "relevant complications exist" or where "the
[physician] has a hunch that [the] procedure may be helpful," as the
AMuIA recommends that CPGs should, then "the statement will lose any
semblance of a guiding standard and the case will degenerate into a
conventional battle of the experts.2
Third, an expert will be needed to testify' as to the physician's
compliance or noncompliance with the relevant guideline. Did the
physician follow the prescribed procedures, and if not, did she have a
valid justification for her deviation in this patient's case? This
function of the expert recognizes that CPGs address the disease or the
intervention, rather than the particular patient. They set forth
general rules and procedures that may not be applicable to a given
patient due to that patient's unique set of symptoms, medical history,
other present medical problems, or preferences for treatment.
213
While the use of professional experts to render opinions certainly is
not unproblematic, the great virtue of experts is their ability to apply a
body of knowledge and expertise to the facts of a particular case. An
", See Begel, supra note 132, at 88 ("[D]efense experts may be necessary to explain
the guidelines and justify their admissibility as conclusive evidence of a standard of
care."); Gamick et al., supra note 4, at 2859 (listing other issues regarding practice
guidelines that will still require expert medical testimony).
'- Rosoff, supra note 25, at 386.
212 Hall, supra note 91, at 132-33.
See Hirshfeld, supra note 20, at 2889 ("A given patient may have physical
characteristics or complicating medical problems that were not anticipated by the
parameter authors, and it may be appropriate to depart from the recommendations or
standards of the parameter."); Woolf, supra note 26, at 2651 ("The patient's medical
history, comorbid illnesses, and personal circumstances may mean that the individual
is better served by options other than those advocated in the guideline.").
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expert can tell the factfinder how other competent physicians would
have dealt with this particular patient. CPGs can only tell the
factfinder how physicians should deal with the symptoms presented in
a hypothetical patient. The decision trees embodied in CPGs do not
and cannot account for every individual-level contingency that might
affect a physician's decision. The Office of Technology Assessment
has estimated that even for garden-variety medical problems, there
may be over ten billion pathways for diagnosing the condition.2 " Since
CPGs are, at best, rudimentary summaries of the most common
pathways, there is much about a doctor's decisionmaking that is not
captured and requires expert explanation. As the former General
Counsel of the AMA has put it, "Working with uncertainty is where
medicine becomes an art as well as a science, and it is not feasible to
expect practice parameters to capture and express the art of
medicine.24 ' It would be impossible to use CPGs as the standard of
care without employing some medical expert to interpret the
guidelines and verify their applicability to the plaintiff's case.
The limited empirical evidence collected to date confirms that the
use of CPGs in malpractice suits does not significantly reduce reliance
on expert witnesses. A survey of 578 attorneys who litigate malpractice
claims found that only 4.7% felt that the use of a guideline decreased
the need for an expert; about 12% felt that the use of a guideline
actually increased the need for an expert; and the remainder felt that
it had no effect."6 In summary, because experts will still be required
to fulfill several functions in malpractice trials, it is wishful thinking to
assert that reliance on CPGs to establish the standard of care will end
the battle of the experts. 47
C. Constitutional Issues
It has thus far been argued that permitting the one-way use of
CPGs in malpractice suits would be ill-advised from the standpoint of
the law of evidence. It would constitute an anomalous deviation from
the general rule that if evidence is relevant and probative, it is
O240TA REPORT, supra note 4, at 143.
245 Hirshfeld, supra note 20, at 2888.
246 Hyams et al., supra note 95, at 453. The researchers concluded that "our results
diminish the hope that guidelines will effectively eliminate the battle of the experts in
malpractice litigation." Id. at 454 (citation omitted).
p47 See Kadzielski et al., supra note 31, at 170 ("[T]he application of guidelines as
affirmative defenses will not change the role of plaintiffs' expert witness in malpractice
litigation.").
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probative both ways and should be admissible by both parties to the
litigation.' While there are examples of this type of asymmetry in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, they are all backed by an important policy
justification. Neither of the justifications offered by Maine-model
reformers-protecting doctors from malpractice litigation or
eliminating the battle of the experts-justifies the asymmetry they
propose.
Some commentators also have argued that the one-way use of
CPGs in malpractice litigation raises constitutional concerns. Both an
equal protection problem and a due process problem have been
posited. The equal protection argument might be formulated in two
different ways. One could argue that Maine-model systems create an
impermissible distinction between civil plaintiffs and civil defendants.
Alternatively, one could argue-as Jennifer Begel has done-that
Maine-model systems unconstitutionally burden medical malpractice
plaintiffs more than other kinds of plaintiffs.' While the first
fonnulation may seem the more intuitive description of the
classification, it is likely that courts would choose to frame the
classification in terms of a distinction between malpractice litigants
and other civil litigants. Maine's one-way admissibility standard has
not been challenged on constitutional grounds, so we cannot be sure
how the classification would be described. Other aspects of Maine's
demonstration project, however, such as its prelitigation notice
requirements and its requirement that plaintiffs submit their claims to
a prelitigation screening panel, have been the subject of equal
protection challengesY ° These equal protection claims were couched
in terms of a distinction between malpractice litigants and other
litigants.'7 The courts in Maine and elsewhere have held that rational
basis review is the appropriate standard of scrutiny for such
classifications, as neither a fundamental right nor a suspect or quasi-
S'' FED. IR EvrD. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible.").
See Begel, supra note 132, at 94-98 (arguing that the Maine system should be
struck down under the rational basis standard).
S e Houk v. Furman, 613 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Me. 1985) (discussing Maine's
prelitigation notice requirement); Irish v. Gimbel, 691 A.2d 664, 673 (Me. 1997)
(holding that Maine's mandatory screening panel process for medical malpractice
actions does not xiolate equal protection).
_A Sa, Houk, 613 F. Supp. at 1028-34 (denying plaintiff's assertion that the notice
requirement "impermissibly distinguishes between medical malpractice plaintiffs and
plaintiffs in other tort actions"); Irish, 691 A.2d at 673 (rejecting plaintiffs' argument
that the screening process created "an arbitrary distinction between medical
malpractice xictims and all other tort victims").
20011
706 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 149:645
suspect class is involved.2 52  Begel appears to believe that the same
analytical framework would be applied in a suit challenging the
23evidentiary provisions of the Maine statute.
Because prelitigation notice requirements and prelitigation
screening requirements facially affect both parties to malpractice
litigation, it is unsurprising that the courts have chosen to view the
classification as malpractice litigants versus other litigants. A closer
parallel to a one-way admissibility rule for CPGs in malpractice cases
might be Federal Rules of Evidence 412 through 415, the rape shield
laws. Like the shield-only CPG rule, the rape shield rules permit one
party to the litigation to introduce a certain kind of seemingly
probative evidence while denying the other party the right to
introduce the same kind of evidence.2 5 4 The rape shield laws have
been challenged on equal protection grounds, and despite the fact
that they appear to set up a classification between prosecutors and
criminal defendants, courts uniformly have analyzed the classification
as one between sexual offense defendants and other criminal
defendants. 255 Finding that sexual offense defendants are not a
suspect class and that the rules do not impinge upon a fundamental
right,5 the courts have applied a rational basis standard of scrutiny
and have implicitly upheld the classification embodied in Rules 412
through 415. If these rules, which significantly burden a criminal
defendant, withstand constitutional scrutiny, then a fortiori, it is
highly likely that a similar evidentiary rule burdening a civil defendant
would be upheld. After all, criminal defendants receive a much
higher level of constitutional protection, under the Fifth and Sixth
22 See Houk, 613 F. Supp. at 1028 ("The plaintiff points to no special
circumstances... which would warrant a departure from the general rule requiring
application of the rational relationship test."); Irish, 691 A.2d at 673 ("We have held
that medical malpractice plaintiffs are not a suspect class and do not possess a
fundamental right to pursue their causes of action. Therefore, we apply the rational
relationship test...." (citation omitted)).
2.3 See Begel, supra note 132, at 95 ("A survey of the jurisdictions in which equal
protection challenges to tort reform measures in the medical malpractice arena haie
been addressed suggests that the classification in the Maine legislation would be tested
according to the rational basis standard.").
25 See supra Part III.A.2 (justifying the asymmetry in rape shield evidence rules).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that
Rule 413 does not violate a fundamental right and that sex-offense defendants are not
a "suspect class"); United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433-34 (10th Cir. 1998)
("Rule 413 does not violate.., a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial. Thus,
the rational basis test applies and a strong presumption of validity attaches to the
evidentiary classification made in enacting Rule 413.").
256 Mound, 149 F.3d at 801; Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433-34.
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Amendments, than do civil defendants.
"57
Thus, it would appear that, regardless of how the classification is
framed, a one-way admissibility rule for CPG evidence would trigger
only rational basis review and would survive an equal protection
challenge. Begel disputes this, arguing that Maine's evidentiary
classification would fail to satisf , even a rational basis analysis. This
argument, however, is unpersuasive. Under the rational basis test, a
legislative classification will be upheld as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate state interest. The threshold for
legitimacy of the interest is very low, and it is likely that a court would
deem the Maine classification's expressed statutory purpose-
encouraging physicians to participate in the demonstration project
(that is, to comply with CPGs) in order to increase the quality of
medical care rendered in Maine-to be sufficient.25'
In addition to an equal protection problem, one might argue that
the one-way use of CPGs in malpractice litigation raises a question of
due process. Begel has commented:
Certainly the right to a jury trial and access to the judicial process are
meaningless if the procedures afforded fail to give the litigants a
complete opportunity to have their claims tried fairly and impartially.
Allowing evidence to be used only by one party and not by the other,
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees a criminal
defendant certain fair trial rights not enjoyed by the prosecution, while the
Fifth Amendment lets the accused choose not to testif , at trial. In contrast,
civil litigants in federal court share equally the protections of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510 (1989). In Green, the Supreme
Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 609 (a) (1), which provides that evidence that
a witness has been convicted of a felony, "shall" be admitted for the purpose of
attacking the witness's credibility "only if" the court determines that the probativeness
of the evidence outweighs its prejudice "to the defendant," did not apply to witnesses
in civil cases. Green, 490 U.S. at 527.
' See Begel, supra note 132, at 96-98 ("Even assuming a Maine court would apply
the lowest level of scrutiny, the rational basis test, to the guidelines legislation, the fact
that it denies plaintiffs [sic] use of relevant evidence regarding compliance with
guidelines would likely render at least that aspect of the legislation unconstitutional.").
In reference to this point, Begel merely states conclusorily that "[s]uch
enticement uould not, and should not, be deemed by any court tojustify the disparate
treatment of medical malpractice litigants under this provision of the legislation." Id.
at 98. The Maine courts, however, previously have found the purpose of "assuring the
continued axailability of affordable health care" to be a legitimate objective justi)4ng a
related classification between malpractice litigants and other litigants, Houk v.
Furman, 613 F. Supp. 1022, 1034 (D. Me. 1985), and this purpose seems sufficiently
similar to the goal of assuring good quality health care that a court would also deem
the latter to be legitimate.
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without any sufficient articulable justification, would seem to make the
proceedings constitutionally suspect. The problem is exacerbated by the
fact that admissibility of the evidence could reasonably be predicted to
260
alter the outcome of any given case.
The AMA has taken the opposite position, that no due process
problem is created by the one-way defensive use of CPGs. It has
argued that nonmutual collateral estoppe 26' and other asymmetries in
the law show that due process does not "require that both parties
always have the benefit of the same legal presumptions or even the
same evidence."262 This may be so, but Begel is right to note that the
key issue is whether or not a sufficient justification exists for the
asymmetry. 3 If there is no legitimate basis for the distinction
between parties, so that the distinction is arbitrary and irrational, it
will not survive a due process challenge. Thus, the legal analysis for a
due process claim concerning the one-way use of CPGs essentially
boils down to the same question as the analysis for an equal protection
claim: Does the differential treatment of the parties have a rational
basis? The answer is likely to be the same: yes. States' interests in
reducing malpractice litigation costs and encouraging physicians to
comply with practice guidelines would probably be deemed sufficient.
Thus, it would appear that the shield-only use of CPGs in
malpractice litigation does not impose an unconstitutional burden
upon plaintiffs under either an equal protection or a due process
theory. This does not mean, however, that such use of CPGs is good
policy. Moreover, even if it is not unconstitutional, a Maine-model
policy violates the spirit of the Federal Rules of Evidence by upsetting
the presumption that the law should treat litigants evenhandedly.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that increased reliance on clinical practice
guidelines to establish the standard of care in medical malpractice
260 Begel, supra note 132, at 100-01.
261 Nonmutual collateral estoppel refers to the ability of one party to invoke a
previous judgment adverse to the other party as a means of precluding the other party
from relitigating the same issue in the instant suit. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (permitting offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel); Blonder-
Tongue Lab. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (allowing defensive
nonmutual collateral estoppel).
262 Hirshfeld, supra note 20, at 2890.
263 See Begel, supra note 132, at 93 ("[T]he validity of the provision would depend,
if presented to a court, on whether the disparate treatment of the parties amounted to
a violation of the State or Federal constitutions.").
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cases would be undesirable whether the guidelines are used in an
inculpatory or an exculpatory fashion. Among the reasons for
disallowing the inculpatory use of CPGs is that CPGs do not appear to
represent custom in most instances. Compliance with most guidelines
is presently quite low, so that the guidelines cannot be said to embody
prevailing medical practice. Departing from custom as the anchor of
the standard of care, and relying on the prescriptions of CPGs instead,
could undermine the deterrent function of tort law by increasing the
amount of uncertainty physicians face in determining what the law
requires of them.
Permitting physicians to use CPGs as an affirmative defense in
malpractice, while denying plaintiffs the right to use this evidence to
prove their own case, is also problematic. Restricting access to
relevant evidence on a key element of a legal claim to one party to the
litigation is an anomaly in the law and requires strong justification,
which is lacking in the case of CPGs. The need to protect physicians
from frivolous lawsuits does not constitute a persuasive justification,
and, contrary to their proponents' claims, Maine-model reforms do
not significantly reduce the problems associated with reliance upon
expert witnesses in malpractice cases. The shield-only use of CPGs is
unfair to plaintiffs, although this unfairness does not appear to rise to
the level of a constitutional violation.
Moreover, while Maine-model reforms may seem to benefit
physicians by giving them a safe harbor, this shelter comes at a price.
Compliance with CPGs may be technically voluntary under a Maine-
model system-that is, physicians can choose whether or not they wish
to take advantage of the affirmative defense-but the practical effect
of such policies may be to make compliance with CPGs mandatory.
Physicians may come to feel as though they have to comply with the
guidelines, under penalty of exposure to a crippling damages award.
The fact that some malpractice insurers have begun to require
compliance with CPGs as a condition of coverage or of affordable
premiums is testimony to the reality of this effect. This is not to say
that more widespread physician compliance with CPGs created by
reputable, authoritative professional societies would be socially
undesirable. To the contrary, there is every indication that it would
improve the quality of care rendered in this country. Physicians,
however, may view mandatory compliance with prescribed guidelines
as a very significant infringement upon their professional autonomy,
and it should be noted that physicians' ability to invoke CPGs
defensively under a Maine-model system may come at the cost of this
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loss of freedom.
Because of these problems with both the inculpatory and the
exculpatory uses of CPGs, the best course of action, at least at this
point in time, is to restrict their use by both plaintiffs and defendants.
CPGs should not be used to replace expert testimony as to the
customary standard of care. This does not mean, however, that there
is no role for CPGs in malpractice litigation. It might be desirable for
experts to use them to lend credence to their own opinions. That is,
an expert could offer an independent opinion as to prevailing
medical practice in the relevant specialty, community, and clinical
situation. Then, if there exists an authoritative set of practice
guidelines that essentially prescribes the same standard of care, the
expert could invoke the guidelines to say, "Not only is this what
physicians actually do, this is also what Professional Society X says is the
optimal thing to do in this situation." This use of CPGs would retain
custom as the standard of care and experts as the means of explaining
current custom to the jury, while allowing both parties to use the
edicts of professional societies as supporting evidence that the custom
itself is reasonable. The advantage of this type of system is twofold:
(1) because it retains custom as the relevant standard, it does not
create an uncertainty or notice problem for physicians; and (2)
because it uses experts rather than written guidelines to determine
the standard of care in a particular case, it is a patient-centered rather
than a disease-centered approach. An expert can review a particular
plaintiff's medical charts and ascertain what was medically required in
the plaintiffs case; CPGs can only tell the court what is required in a
typical case where the patient presents a certain medical condition or
set of symptoms.
Such a system would represent a sounder, less radical alternative
to the reforms proposed by advocates of the judicial notice model and
the Maine model. Though well-intentioned, those reformers fail to
appreciate the fact that we are still in the technological adolescence of
the clinical practice guidelines movement. We have yet to resolve
basic issues such as which set of guidelines is the authoritative
prescription for a particular medical problem, what procedures
should be used to create guidelines, what institutions, goals, and
values should drive their development, and how we can ensure that
guidelines are disseminated and adopted by physicians. It would be
foolhardy to make CPGs the centerpiece of malpractice litigation
before the science of creating and implementing them on a wide scale
has fully evolved.
